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Said a man ingenuously to one of his friends: "This morning
we condemned three men to death. Two of them definitely de-
served it."1
Let me tell of the strange travels of Defendant X.2 Defend-
ant X is a legal aid client arrested in New York in August 1991
and detained before trial based on future dangerousness. The
Metropolitan Community Correctional Center in Manhattan
(MCC-NY) initially detained him. The Marshall Service then
moved him to the Federal Correctional Institution at Otisville.
Because of overcrowded conditions at both sites, the government
transported Defendant X to the county jail in Webb County,
Texas, for five weeks. They then moved him to the Federal Cor-
rectional Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma, for a fortnight. On
November 11, 1991, he returned to MCC-NY for his second court
appearance. 3
Defense attorneys recount troubling stories about being un-
able to see detained clients, like Defendant X, because of con-
stant relocation from one correctional institution to another.4
Moreover, when attorney and client finally do meet, the client is
often so exhausted from the constant relocations that the meet-
ings are not productive. Numerous federal district judges have
commented on this sorry state of affairs.5
Pretrial detention is politically popular because it symbol-
izes a government tough on crime.6 But this symbolism carries
high costs. Pretrial detention hardens detainees and alienates
them from a society that is increasingly receptive to historically
unjustified restraints on liberty. Pretrial detention results in a
detained defendant's inability to prepare and aid in his or her
defense. Detention is expensive, costing United States taxpay-
ers $110.6 million to house 11,740 detainees per day.7 Yet indi-
viduals released on bail commit only about six percent of
1. DAVID S. SCHRAGER & ELIZABETH FROST, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 261
(1986).
2. The true story of Defendant X is a typical saga of pretrial detainees.
See Daniel B. Ryan, The Federal Detention Crisis: Causes and Effects, 57 FED.
PROBATION 54, 54 (1993).
3. Id. at 55.
4. Id. at 55-56.
5. Id.
6. Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 373-74 (1970).
7. Ryan, supra note 2, at 55.
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crimes.8 From an administrative perspective, pretrial detention
is a nightmare. 9 From a societal perspectiire, detention has
fared no better. In the morass of hyperbole that surrounds the
debate on detention and bail recidivism, Americans lose sight of
the role our country has historically played as "a nation with
moral authority in a troubled world."10
Detaining a presumptively innocent person on the basis of
future dangerousness pits an individual's freedom against gov-
ernmental interests. The compelling interest in preventing bail
crime, however, is an insufficient justification for pretrial deten-
tion. A fundamental right is at stake: the presumptively inno-
cent individual's right to be free of governmental restraint
absent a prior adjudication.
The prevalence of pretrial detention is largely a function of
our bivalent system of law,". a system comprising strings of ones
and zeroes. Because of its inability to account for partial de-
grees of truth, necessary in a world of gray, a binary model re-
quires a decision maker to round off the evidence and confine the
case to total truth or no-truth to make a decision. In the end,
easy detention cases look like hard ones and hard detention
cases look like very hard ones.
This Article challenges the traditional notions of a bivalent
jurisprudence, addressing its limitations through analysis of
pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 ("the
BRA"). 12 The Article rejects the present detention model for its
failure to account for the varying degrees of culpability, danger-
8. Tribe, supra note 6, at 371 & n.5. The 1992 arrest rate of federal de-
fendants out on bail was three percent. Ryan, supra note 2, at 62.
9. Tribe, supra note 6, at 372-73.
10. William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy And Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1,
14 (1960).
11. The prevalent models of legal interpretation (rules, categorization,
standards, balancing) turn on strong distinctions between right and wrong and
on the rule of the excluded middle. The binary model thus denies a legal uni-
verse of gradation. A binary model of the wonderfully complex texture of the
law is a crude tool.
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-211 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). By authorizing the use of pretrial
detention, based in part on a court's assessment of a defendant's dangerous-
ness, the BRA departed from the previous policy of federal bail law, which im-
posed bail to ensure the appearance of a defendant at trial or to protect the
integrity of the judicial process. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
465, 80 Stat. 214-217, repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
98 Stat. 1976-211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990)); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951) (explaining that
bail ensures the defendant's trial appearance).
1994] 327
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ousness, and detainability. The pretrial detention model con-
structed in this Article instead rests on the axioms of a fuzzy
universe. 13 Fuzzy logic, which allows a decision maker to ac-
count for varying degrees of truth, provides a more graceful way
in which to identify, analyze, resolve, and discuss the legal is-
sues posed by pretrial detention. Fuzzy logic rejects the duality
embodied in the bivalent model as a confining force; it recognizes
that rules and categorization as well as standards and balancing
are elements of the same set whose fuzziness turns on degrees of
judicial discretion.
The foundation of fuzzy logic is fuzzy set theory. Unlike Ar-
istotelian or formal logic, which recognizes statements as only
true or false, fuzzy set theory recognizes partial membership in
one or more sets at the same time.14 Fuzzy set theory abolishes
the law of the excluded middle found in formal set theory.
Whereas formal set theory insists that a variable be either in or
out of the set, fuzzy set theory permits a variable to be in and
out of the set simultaneously, usually by reducing the quality of
a variable to a qualitative relation.' 5 Part I of this Article exam-
ines the statutory model of pretrial detention. It describes the
history of the BRA and its initial incorporation of fuzzy vari-
ables. Part II addresses the metaphysical and constitutional is-
sues posed by predictions of dangerousness, and the BRA's
standard for pretrial detention. It examines the scientific litera-
ture that places dangerousness predictions at scantly better
than chance. Part II also argues that the Supreme Court has so
far avoided specific and empirical challenges to dangerousness
predictions by recasting these challenges as normative attacks
that are quickly dispatched.
Part III explains the importance of the metaphor employed
in analyzing procedural due process issues. It argues that the
perspective used to analyze the pretrial detention determination
13. See generally FuzzY SETS AND APPLICATIONS: SELECTED PAPERS BY L.A.
ZADEH (R.R. Yager et al. eds., 1987) (providing the best tutorial on fuzzy sets);
BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FuZZY LOGIC (1993) (pro-
viding background information on fuzzy sets); Jack F. Williams, Fallacies of
Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to Intercorporate Guar-
anties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1403,
1448-69 (1994) (discussing fraudulent transfer law as a fuzzy system).
14. See generally VICTORIA A. KADER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Fuzzy
LOGIC: A KEY TECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE COMP=rnVENEss (1991) (describing
fuzzy set theory).
15. For example, the fuzzy set of blue swans admits any swan that is less
than totally blue because blue becomes a matter of degree. The pale blue swan
is, therefore, both in and out of the set.
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affects the ultimate conclusion of what process is due. In con-
structing a fuzzy model, this Article shows the importance of the
characterization of the dangerousness issue to the debate. 16
Part III also explains the distinction in traditional due pro-
cess jurisprudence between the intrinsic and process-sensitive
theories.' 7 Part III then analyzes the distinction between cate-
gorizing and balancing competing interests. It argues that each
approach requires the context of the other to make sense. It also
argues that the choice between the two approaches turns on a
strong right-wrong distinction inherent in a bivalent model of
justice. The pretrial detention provisions that Congress drafted,
however, rested on a sound fuzzy foundation. The detention
scheme recognized different degrees of dangerousness by requir-
ing a court to consider a list of conditions other than detention
before it could impose detention. 18 Part III shows that the
Supreme Court, in altering the assessment of dangerousness
and detention from fuzziness back to bivalence, has contravened
congressional intent and sacrificed individual rights.' 9
Part IV presents a model that re-unites pretrial detention
with its historical, moral, and ethical roots. It constructs a
value-based model of due process deriving its axioms from fuzzy
logic. 20 This model focuses the detention inquiry on the defend-
ant's culpability, the precise danger posed by the defendant, and
the conditions short of outright detention that may address the
harm to the public posed by the pretrial release of the defend-
16. Authorities tend to frame the operative question in general, categorical
terms, such as, whether the defendant is a member of a class that the legisla-
ture has identified as dangerous. The legislature, not the courts, is the ultimate
arbiter of dangerousness. Additionally, this paradigmatic model focuses on
dangerousness, not detention, thus collapsing the two distinctly different deter-
minations into one. It limits the guilt of a defendant to a secondary role. In
contrast, a model viewed through a fuzzy lens asks whether a particular de-
fendant is dangerous, mandating more specific process.
17. The model of procedural due process defended in this Article, unlike
the process-sensitive theories, recognizes that the deprivation process is a prob-
abilistic endeavor. Tolerance for inaccuracy under the Due Process Clause de-
pends on the weightiness of the individual's rights and governmental interests
at stake.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); see infra note 43 and accom-
panying text (identifying statutory conditions for release rather than
detention).
19. For further documentation of what factors lead to a court's detention
decision, see generally Jack F. Williams, Classifying Pre-Trial Detention Deci-
sions Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Statistical Approach, 30 AM. CRm.
L. REV. 255 (1993).




ant. All three of the model's decisional prongs are sufficiently
dynamic to account for varying degrees of culpability, danger,
and public harm.
The model proposed in Part IV contains five components.
The first component limits offenses that trigger the application
of pretrial detention, eschewing the vagaries of a "crime of vio-
lence" standard. The second component requires the govern-
ment to seek detention at a defendant's first appearance before a
court in the charging district.21 The third component contains
strict time limits on the length of detention. The fourth compo-
nent insists that detention must be part of a comprehensive bail
package. Finally, the model increases the standard of proof to
one of clear and convincing evidence, establishing substantively
and symbolically the importance of that which is at stake in the
detention process: the liberty of a presumptively innocent de-
fendant and society's view of such people.
I. FEDERAL PRETRIAL DETENTION
Pretrial detention has deep roots in legal tradition.22 Athe-
nian magistrates, sworn to release a citizen pending trial if the
citizen could provide three sureties, denied bail to those persons
charged with treason or embezzlement of public monies.23
Blackstone noted that bail was improper for murder, treason,
arson, escape from prison, and manslaughter if the accused was
"clearly the slayer and not barely suspected to be so."24 Histori-
cally, our government detained mentally unstable individuals25
21. If the government fails to seek detention at the defendants first ap-
pearance, it waives its right to seek detention.
22. For a thorough account of the origins of pretrial detention, see Alan M.
Dershowitz, The Origins Of Pretrial Confinement In Anglo-American Law-
Part I: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 11-28 (1974); see also Alan
M. Dershowitz, The Law Of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions,
23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 26 (1970) [hereinafter Dershowitz, Law of Dangerous-
ness] (discussing the history of preventive justice).
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACESTONE, CommrAIEs *297.
24. 4 id. at *298-*99. Many of the nonbailable offenses that Blackstone
noted involved crimes of violence. The remaining nonbailable offenses focused
on the weight of the evidence or the reasonable belief that the defendant posed
a substantial risk of flight: 'For what is there that a man may not be induced to
forfeit, to save his own life?" 4 id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988 & Supp. H
1990) (providing factors to consider when determining whether to impose pre-
trial detention under the BRA).
25. E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (discussing the
justifications for civil commitment).
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and arrested juveniles 26 who posed a danger to society, danger-
ous defendants found incompetent to stand trial,27 defendants
charged with a capital crime,28 defendants who had threatened
jurors or witnesses, 29 and defendants who posed a significant
risk of flight.30
Consistent with this history, Congress enacted the BRA in
1984 to stem what it perceived as "the growing problem of crime
committed by persons on release."31 Congress concluded that
the need to protect society from "a small but identifiable group of
particularly dangerous defendants" required pretrial deten-
tion.32 Critics of the 1966 Act,33 the BRA's predecessor, argued
that it failed to address the alarming rate of bail crime: "Federal
bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes commit-
ted by persons on release and must give the courts adequate au-
thority to make release decisions that give appropriate
recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if
released."34
Bail law, as it related to detention based on dangerousness,
reached the height of bivalence under the 1966 Act.3 5 Under
26. E.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 270 (1984) (holding that a juvenile
may be detained after arrest to prevent pre-trial crime).
27. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972) (discussing com-
mitment standards for mentally incompetent defendants).
28. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, judges were authorized to detain
defendants charged with capital crimes pending trial and post-conviction de-
fendants who posed either a danger to the community or a substantial risk of
flight. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214-217, repealed
by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-211 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990)); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 46 (outlining the rules for releasing a defendant prior to trial).
29. E.g., United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding
that a judicial officer may consider evidence that the defendant threatened wit-
nesses in setting terms for release).
30. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (stating that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in ensuring that criminal defendants are avail-
able for trial); see also United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.)
(holding that a substantial risk of flight may justify denial of bail), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978).
31. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3188-89; Ann M. Overbeck, Comment, Detention for the
Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 153, 155 (1986).
32. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3189.
33. E.g., Steven R. Schlesinger, Bail Reform: Protecting the Community
and the Accused, 9 Hnv. J.L. & PuB. PoiY 173, 177-78 (1986) (contending that
the current bail system fails to achieve its stated goals).
34. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-.AN. at
3185.
35. See supra note 12 (discussing the 1966 Act).
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that Act, if a court found that a defendant posed a danger to the
community, it either had to release the defendant or set unlaw-
fully high bail that the defendant would be unable to meet.3 6 A
court could not simply detain a defendant to ensure community
safety.37 The 1966 Act thus required courts to round off the evi-
dence on community danger, surreptitiously forcing defendants
into one category or the other. Congress specifically noted this
dilemma during its debate on the BRA.38 By authorizing pre-
trial detention, the BRA has functionally eliminated arbitrarily
high bail (and concomitant dishonesty).
Under the BRA, a defendant must appear before a judicial
officer 3 9 for arraignment without unnecessary delay.40 At this
initial appearance, a judicial officer must advise a defendant of
his or her rights and must detain or conditionally release a de-
fendant either on bail or personal recognizance. 41 The BRA re-
quires a judicial officer to order pretrial release on personal
recognizance or unsecured bond unless the officer determines
that release would not reasonably ensure a defendant's appear-
ance or would endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.42 Even if a judicial officer determines that release
would result in flight or danger, the officer must order a defend-
ant's conditional release if any conditions will adequately safe-
guard these security interests.43 These conditions may include
36. Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRim. L. REv. 1, 7 (1989).
37. Id. at 4-7; see also United States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124, 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussing the judicial policy underlying the 1966 Act).
38. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3188 ("[I]t is intolerable that the law denies judges the tools to make honest
and appropriate decisions regarding the release of such defendants.").
39. A "judicial officer" is broadly defined to include federal judges and "any
chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common
pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state
where the offender may be found." 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). A court determines "unnecessary delay" from the
facts and circumstances of each case. Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781,
798 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960).
41. FED. R. Citm. P. 5(b)-(c). The BRA provides for a hierarchy of 14 condi-
tions that favor a defendant's release on personal recognizance. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1988). Judicial officers must pursue one of four
enumerated alternatives: release the defendant on personal recognizance or
upon execution of an unsecured bond; release the defendant subject to increas-
ingly restrictive conditions; temporarily detain the defendant; or order pretrial
detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (a)-(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); JOHN L. WEINBERG,
FEDERAL BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK 6-1 to 6-11 (1991).
43. A court can require the defendant to meet the following conditions:
[Vol. 79:325
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drug testing, house arrest, or other similar alternatives short of
pretrial detention.44
II. THE METAPHYSICS OF DANGEROUSNESS
PREDICTIONS
The bedrock of the BRA is a court's ability to predict a de-
fendant's future dangerousness. The BRA's legislative history,
however, recognizes that courts predict dangerousness poorly.45
(i) remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees to [su-
pervise him or her]... ;
(ii) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek
employment;
(iii) maintain or commence an educational program;
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of
abode, or travel;
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a
potential witness who may testify concerning the offense;
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement
agency, pretrial services agency, or other agency;
(vii) comply with a specified curfew;
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other
dangerous weapon;
(ix) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug
or other controlled substance ... without a prescription by a licensed
medical practitioner;
(x) undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric treat-
ment... ;
(xi) execute an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as re-
quired, such designated property... as is reasonably necessary to as-
sure the appearance of the person as required... ;
(xii) return to custody for specified hours following release for employ-
ment, schooling, or other limited purposes; and
(xiii) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure
the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of
any other person and the community.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Pretrial release of every defendant
is also subject to the condition that the defendant refrain from committing any
crime while on bond and meet all appearance requirements. WEBERG, supra
note 42, at 6-4.
44. See United States v. Traetz, 807 F.2d 322, 326 (3rd Cir. 1986); see also
DEmuRE GOLASH, THE BAIL REFORM AcT oF 1984, at 1 (Federal Judicial Center
1987) (listing several alternatives to pretrial detention). In United States v.
Renzulli, No. 87-258-7, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8750, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28,
1987), the court observed that "other similar alternatives" could include daily
telephone reporting, the surrender of all firearms, 24-hour telephone monitor-
ing, the wearing of beeper devices to restrict travel, and the surrender of
passports.
45. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 9, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3192 ("[W]hether future criminality can be predicted, an assumption implicit in
permitting pretrial detention based on perceived defendant dangerousness, is
one which neither the experience under the District of Columbia detention stat-
ute nor empirical analysis can conclusively answer.").
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Experts have had little success in predicting future dangerous-
ness, and courts appear to fare no better.46 The criminal justice
system, however, demands that courts predict future dangerous-
ness. 47 "The concept [predictions of dangerousness] is so long-
standing and such an integral part of our legal system that the
Supreme Court... characterized the defendant's request to pro-
hibit predictions of dangerousness in capital cases as 'somewhat
like asking us to disinvent the wheel.' "48
Dangerousness predictions are generally anamnestic,
clinical, or statistical.49 Anamnestic predictions reason that a
person's past behavior can predict how that person will behave
in future like circumstances. 50 Clinical predictions are an ex-
pert's intuitive judgments after some evaluation based on the
expert's training, experience, and good judgment.51 Statistical
or actuarial predictions are based on statistical evidence that a
person possesses traits associated with a greater likelihood of
future dangerousness. 52 The consensus among experts is that
clinical predictions of dangerousness, like court decisions, are
inferior to statistical predictions.53
46. Shari J. Cohen, Note, Circumventing Due Process: A Judicial Response
to Criminal Recidivism Under the Bail Reform Act, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
319, 330-33 (1988).
47. Dangerousness predictions are made for involuntary commitment, re-
lease on bail, sentence enhancement, imposition of the death penalty, and pa-
role. See Elyce H. Zenoff, Controlling The Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA
Standards and Beyond, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562, 562 n.2 (1985).
48. Id. at 562-63 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983)).
49. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical
Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAmE J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoLY 393,
404-09 (1986); see also George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerous.
ness" of Normal Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523, 529 (1980) (clarifying
distinctions between clinical and statistical analysis); Charles P. Ewing, Schall
v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness Through The Looking
Glass, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (theorizing that predictions of future
dangerousness proceed along either clinical or statistical lines of reasoning).
50. Miller & Morris, supra note 49, at 404-06.
51. Id. at 405.
52. Id. at 404-09.
53. To assess the accuracy of the two techniques, Professor Paul Meehl an-
alyzed the accuracy of approximately 20 prediction studies in which both
clinical and statistical methods were employed. PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VER-
SUS STATISTICAL PREDICTIONS 83-128 (1954). In all but one study, the "predic-
tions made actuarially were either approximately equal or superior to those
made by a clinician." Id. at 119; see also Arthur R. Angel et al., Comment, Pre-
ventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 300, 325
(1971) (noting that variables used to predict default do not predict recidivism).
Professor Barbara Underwood suggests that, unlike an actuarial or statis-
tical prediction, a clinical approach to dangerousness predictions is not com-
mitted to a set of criteria or protocol before the decision is made. Barbara D.
[Vol. 79:325
1994] FUZZY LOGIC 335
A. SCIENTIFIC DEFICIENCIES IN PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS
Courts and commentators have recognized the many scien-
tific studies showing fundamental deficiencies in predictions of
dangerousness. Professor Alan Stone asserts: "The concept of
dangerousness is the stumbling block of all empirical science,
but it is the key to the moral principles adopted recently by
judges and legislative bodies critical of psychiatry.
[D]angerousness is an empty formula for legal decisions, inade-
quate for deciding concrete individual cases."54
The detention of adults charged with serious crimes who
pose a future danger to society is difficult to dispute. Both moral
and utilitarian grounds may justify detention to protect society
in these limited circumstances. 55 Nonetheless, what appears to
be fair in the abstract may be oppressive in application:
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical In-
ference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1423 (1979). Conse-
quently, Underwood observes that the clinical approach, unlike statistical
predictions, allows the decision maker the freedom to respond to the individual
at issue. Id. Contra Williams, supra note 19, at 288-89 (asserting that statisti-
cal predictions are sufficiently flexible to permit individualized determinations).
54. Alan A. Stone, The New Legal Standard of Dangerousness: Fair in
Theory, Unfair in Practice, in DANGEROUSNESS: PROBABILITY AND PREDICTION,
PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLIcY 13, 18 (Christopher D. Webster et al. eds.,
1985) [hereinafter DANGEROUSNESS]. A perusal of older studies supports Pro-
fessor Stone's skepticism. For instance, a 1972 article by researchers at the
Massachusetts Center for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerous Persons
reported on a 10-year study investigating 592 male offenders. Harry L. Kozol et
al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRmr & DELINQ. 371
(1972). Forty-nine offenders predicted to be dangerous based on clinical tech-
niques were released. Of those released, 34.7% committed a post-release dan-
gerous act. Id. at 390. The study observed a false positive rate of over 65%. Id.
at 392. In the study, danger was defined as the potential for inflicting serious
bodily harm, a definition more restrictive and focused than that under the BRA.
Id. at 372.
In 1973, Maryland reported on its experience with the Patuxent Institution
from 1955 to 1964. PATUXENT INST., MD. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORREC-
TIONAL SERV., MARYLAND'S DEFECTIVE DELINQUENT STATUTE: A PROGRESS RE-
PORT 2-3 (Jan. 9, 1973). The study reviewed 421 committed offenders, of whom
286 were released after treatment. One hundred individuals were granted con-
ditional release; the remainder were released unconditionally. Id. The study
reported a false positive rate of 61% among the class released on conditions. Id.
The study reported a recidivism rate of 46% and a false positive rate of 54%
among the class released unconditionally. Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (upholding
pretrial detention intended to protect public safety). As Professor Elyce Zenoff
has noted, pretrial detention meets Professor Francis A. Allen's morality-of-
ends test. Zenoff, supra note 47, at 566. Allen's morality-of-ends focuses on the
goals society pursues through legislation. Id.
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But what about the morality of means? There is morality of ends and a
morality of means. The morality of ends concerns itself with what
goals are to be pursued through the utilization of state power. The
morality of means is concerned with the propriety-the effectiveness
and decency-of devices proposed to achieve social objectives. 56
The morality of means demands scrutiny of detention proce-
dures. Criminal sanctions are not ends in themselves, but are
means to accomplish important societal goals.57
Unfortunately, people tend to focus on the ends with little
consideration of the means used to achieve those ends.58 Fur-
thermore, many interpret questions about means as an attack
on the importance of the underlying social goal.59 This observa-
tion holds true in the detention context. After all, no one could
take serious issue with minimizing bail recidivism. It is unfor-
tunate that those who object to the manner of minimizing bail
recidivism are often dismissed as "soft on crime."60
Empirical studies generally conclude that pretrial predic-
tions of dangerousness are inaccurate. 6' These studies show
that a large number of nondangerous defendants are neverthe-
less detained as dangerous. 62 This observation is expected be-
cause it is natural for a decision maker to concentrate on the
tangible harm caused by the release of a dangerous defendant
56. Zenoff, supra note 47, at 566 (citation omitted).
57. Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal
Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 737, 740 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Professor Allen makes another observation relevant to this discussion:
"Much of the morality of means, of course, is given expression in constitutional
doctrine; but too often American constitutionalism diverts thought about social
policy from needed consideration of its rationality and decency." Id. at 757.
Thus, in our attempt to seek out and slay the myriad constitutional issues
posed by pretrial detention under the BRA, we neglect a frank assessment of
the rationality and decency of detention.
61. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION-
MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
122-27 (1980) (listing factors that make predictions of pretrial releasees
unreliable).
62. See John Monahan, The Prediction of Violence, in VIOLENCE AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 18-20 (Duncan Chappell & John Monahan eds., 1975); see also
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1496 (1966)
(suggesting that preventive dention is ineffective and unnecessary). See gener-
ally Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predic-
tions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REv.
1084 (1976) (finding that patients evaluated as dangerous by psychiatrists
were not more dangerous than those evaluated as nondangerous); John
Monahan, Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 10 (1984) (concluding that dangerousness predictions are wrong about
95% of the time).
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rather than the intangible harm caused by the detention of a
nondangerous defendant.
Thus, a court's detention decisions are not error free. There
are two inversely related types of errors a court can make in
predicting dangerousness. Courts commit Type I errors, or false
positives, when they reject a true null hypothesis.63 For exam-
ple, a court could detain a defendant who actually would not
have committed a crime if released. Courts commit Type II er-
rors, or false negatives, when they fail to reject a false null hy-
pothesis.64 A court commits a Type II error by ordering the
release of a defendant who then commits a crime while on bail.
Type I and Type II errors are mutually exclusive; minimiz-
ing the probability of making a Type I error maximizes the
probability of making a Type II error.6 5 The converse holds true
as well.66 For example, a court could reduce the chance of mak-
ing a Type I error (detention of a nondangerous defendant) by
releasing everyone. In so doing, however, the court increases
the chance of making a Type II error (releasing a dangerous de-
fendant). Generally, a court chooses to risk making the type of
error it perceives as fostering the less severe societal conse-
quences. Consequently, a court will generally prefer a Type I
error (detaining a nondangerous defendant) to a Type II error
(releasing a dangerous defendant).67
Although several older studies concluded that a decision
maker can predict dangerousness within acceptable limits, these
studies emphasized that the prediction was only as good as a
decision maker's ability to adhere to some strict guidelines,
which are generally unrealistic in the judicial process. 68 The ex-
63. DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGA-
TION § 2.10.3, at 81 (1986).
64. Id.
65. JANET P. MouPsUND, EVALUATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH DE-
SIGN 108-10 (1973).
66. Id.
67. Cf JAMEs P. LEVINE ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A PUBLIC POLICY AP-
PROACH 424-25 (1980) (reaching similar conclusions regarding dangerousness
predictions of parole board).
68. Professor John Monahan has identified six indicators of future violent
behavior: past violence, sex (90% of violent criminals are male), age (men be-
tween 15 and 20 account for 35% of all violent crimes), race (nonwhites account
for a disproportionate share of those arrested), socioeconomic status (unem-
ployed persons commit more violent crimes), and substance abuse. JOHN
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71-77 (1981).
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perts' predictions of future dangerousness are quite different
from those predictions judges must make under the BRA.69
Well before the enactment of the BRA, the "prediction of
dangerous behavior ha[d] become a central topic in psychia-
try."70 One of the leading critics of dangerousness predictions in
the judicial process is Professor Alan Stone.71 According to
Stone, psychiatrists are unable "to predict violence, to prognosti-
cate future behavior."72
After reviewing a number of clinical and statistical studies
on the prediction of dangerousness, one commentator concluded
that the studies betray a false positive rate regularly in excess of
fifty to sixty percent.73 In these circumstances, the false positive
rate measures the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.74
It thus "appears that the statistical predictions of criminal be-
havior in general, and violent behavior in particular, are much
more likely to be wrong than right."7 5
Acknowledging that predictions of dangerousness are diffi-
cult and unenviable, 76 Professor Park E. Dietz has nevertheless
developed a prediction model that ranks predictors into three
mutually exclusive broad groups. 77 First-rank predictors of dan-
gerousness (the commission of intolerable crimes as defined by
Dietz) have a greater than fifty percent probability of predicting
69. See, e.g., David Jett, Note, The Loss of Innocence: Preventive Detention
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 805, 813 (1985) (noting
that "the conditions under which the various studies have been made are very
different from those existing in pretrial detention").
70. See Christopher D. Webster et al., Introduction, in DANGEROUSNESS,
supra note 54, at 1, 1; see also Park E. Dietz, Hypothetical Criteria for the Pre-
diction of Individual Criminality, in DANGEROUSNESS, supra note 54, at 87, 89-
90 (discussing the inability of clinicians to predict dangerous behavior).
71. For an influential critique of dangerousness predictions, see generally
ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1975).
72. Stone, supra note 54, at 13 ("I found the published studies of prediction
woefully inadequate, poorly conceived, wrongly interpreted, and well below any
acceptable standard of scientific research or even solid clinical experience."); see
also Robert J. Menzies et al., Hitting the Forensic Sound Barrier: Predictions of
Dangerousness in a Pretrial Psychiatric Clinic, in DANGEROUSNESS, supra note
54, at 115, 117, 131 (contending that personal and statistical bias distorts the
process of predicting dangerousness).
73. See Ewing, supra note 49, at 182-96.
74. Id. at 196-97.
75. Id. at 196.
76. Dietz, supra note 70, at 87. Professor Dietz offers his ranked predictive
hypotheses with much caution and qualification. Although tentative, the hy-
potheses are a creative attempt to bring more objectivity and order to predic-
tions of dangerousness.
77. Id. at 93.
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dangerousness.78 These predictors "are those believed to be so
highly and specifically associated with the criterion variable
(i.e., the commission of any intolerable crime) that the presence
of a single predictor is sufficient for a positive prediction."7 9 Sec-
ond-rank predictors identify a probability of dangerousness of
between ten and fifty percent.80 Dietz noted that it would "be
78. Id.
79. Id. First-rank predictors include:
1. One murder with mutilation of the corpse
2. One murder with vampirism
3. One murder with cannibalism
4. One murder with antemortem sexual sadism
5. One contract murder
6. One sniper murder of a stranger
7. One abduction with torture of the victim
8. Three forcible rapes of strangers
9. One arson episode with sexual arousal
10. Two arson episodes for profit
11. One kidnapping for ransom
12. One bombing of an occupied building
13. Two bombings of motor vehicles
14. One forcible rape with torture of the victim
15. Two episodes in which a child under 12 was forcibly raped or
tortured
16. One instance of insertion of the penis in a body orifice of an infant
17. Three batteries of an individual child under 12
18. Three batteries of a spouse within 1 year
19. Three or more felonious assaultive acts within 1 year with esca-
lating degrees of violence
20. Two unprovoked attacks on strangers with a lethal weapon
21. Five violent offenses of any kind
22. Threats to kill another named person uttered three or more
times, at least two of which included no display of anger, and ex-
tending over a period of at least 3 months
23. Preoccupation with a casual acquaintance or stranger lasting
more than 3 months with at least one attempt at direct communication
with the other person and at least one potentially injurious action di-
rected at the other person, a surrogate for the other person, someone
believed to be associated with the other person, or an effigy or symbol
of the other person
24. A plan to commit an intolerable crime that the subject says he or
she fully intends to carry out and a history of any violent felony
25. Delusional beliefs not acknowledged as delusional by the subject
that, if true, would justify an intolerable crime and a history of any
violent felony and a history of stopping medication against medical
advice
Id. at 94.
80. Id. Second-rank predictors include:
1. One firearm offense within the preceding year
2. One forcible rape within the preceding year
3. One burglary with destruction of female clothing or bedding, kill-
ing of a pet, theft of fetish items, or writing on a wall or mirror
4. Sadistic sexual fantasies and a history of any violent felony
5. One attempted or completed arson
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most accurate to predict all such persons [who triggered second-
rank predictors] to be negative [i.e., not dangerous]."8 ' He also
recognizes, however, that the dangerousness decision requires a
sort of balancing between an individual and society, and that
society may prefer detaining some nondangerous defendants
to protect itself from dangerous ones.8 2 Dietz's third-rank
predictors define populations with a dangerousness probability
of less than ten percent.8 3
6. One attempted or completed abduction
7. Any offense in which the victim was bound
8. The purchase of a weapon with a threat or plan to harm someone
9. One offense the initial intent of which was to acquire material
goods but which came to involve unnecessary violence when something
did not go according to plan
10. One episode of brutality toward an unresisting victim during the
commission of another offense
11. Two batteries against anyone in the home within the past year
12. Two batteries within a residential institution within the past year
13. Use of a lethal weapon in the intentional destruction of an effigy
or symbol of a family member or lover or such person's property within
the past year
14. Morbid jealousy with a history of any violent offense
15. Alcoholism and any violent offense within the past year
16. Alcoholism and a habit of carrying a lethal weapon
17. One episode of unlawfully cutting another person with a knife
18. One episode of unlawfully drugging or poisoning another person
19. Keeping a diary describing past crimes
20. Tape recording the victim's utterances in a previous offense
21. A diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder with at least one
arrest for a violent offense
22. A diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with a history of at least
two violent acts while psychotic and at least two episodes of stopping
neuroleptic medication against medical advice
23. A history of being abused during childhood coupled with an arrest
for any violent offense
24. Use of a lethal weapon at any time in the interest of preserving
an ongoing, profitable, unlawful enterprise (e.g., pimping, prostitution,
or drug dealing)
25. Three violent offenses of any kind
Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id. at 94-95.
83. Id. at 95. Third-rank predictors include:
1. Has a juvenile record
2. Has a felony record
3. Is male
4. Age is 16 to 24
5. Is black
6. Is poor
7. Father is absent from family of origin
8. Has a tattoo
9. Possesses a cheap handgun
10. Has a gun collection
11. Has a preference for bondage and domination pornography
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Dietz identifies the predictors not to predict dangerousness,
but to test predictions of dangerousness. His predictors are
identified here to contrast them with the factors a court must
consider at a detention hearing. While Dietz lists some seventy-
five factors based on his extensive experience, the BRA lists
eleven.8 4 The BRA factors include:
1. Weight of evidence
2. Obstruction of justice
3. Crime of violence or drugs
4. Bail or probation crimes
5. Drug or alcohol history
6. Employment status
7. Character, physical or mental condition
8. Court appearance record
9. Lack of family or community ties
10. Criminal history
12. Reads detective magazines
13. Reads mercenary and terrorist magazines
14. Owns child pornography
15. Collects Nazi memorabilia
16. Has sought out work with the wounded in an accident depart-
ment or ambulance service
17. Has sought out work with the dead in a morgue or funeral home
18. Has sought out flesh-incising work in a butcher shop, slaughter
house, or operating theater
19. Has worked as a private security guard or auxiliary police officer
20. Has worked as a volunteer fireman
21. Has been a paid employee in a police, fire, or correctional depart-
ment in association with any personality disorder or sexual deviation
22. Has been or is associated with an extremist political organization
23. Is preoccupied with inner fantasies to the detriment of social
functioning
24. Has a first-degree relative with a criminal record
25. Has a history of threatening and filing lawsuits that have never
succeeded
Id. at 96.
84. Dietz makes one further observation of note:
Perhaps one day the clinical prediction of intolerable crime will be a
task for the as yet unrecognized specialty of clinical criminology. In
the meantime, a body of variously informed clinicians, most of whom
have only minimal knowledge of crime, will remain empowered and
expected by the courts and the public to make professional judgments
about matters beyond their competence. Some, of course, seek to ac-
quire expertise about "dangerousness" (although rarely about crime).
Many others, unfortunately, are content to accept the false assumption
by the courts and public that they are, indeed, experts in the prediction
of criminal conduct. The confidence man's work is not legitimized by
the abundance of eager victims. To predict criminal behavior without
knowledge of crime is a psycholegal confidence game.
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted). After contrasting Dietz's lists of predictive factors
with the BRA's list, one is persuaded that predicting criminal behavior without
knowledge of behavior is also a psycholegal confidence game.
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11. Statutory presumptions of dangerousness (bail recidivism or
drug-and-firearm).8 5
These eleven factors have an interesting lineage. Factors
one through nine are from the 1966 Act, which denied bail only
to ensure the appearance of a defendant at trial.8 6 Thus, the
reliability of these factors as predictors of dangerousness is
questionable. Moreover, there is little empirical support for the
nine factors as accurate and reliable predictors of dangerous-
ness. The tenth factor is from the District of Columbia's pretrial
detention statute and involves a defendant's criminal history.8 7
The eleventh factor is the presumption of dangerousness that
arises under the BRA in certain delineated circumstances and is
lacking empirical support.88
The empirical support for the BRA is vital, given some ex-
perts' guarded optimism over the predictability of dangerous-
ness.89 In arguing that statistical studies show improved
prediction over clinical studies,90 Professors Deidre Kilassen and
William O'Connor identified factors to include in any predictive
effort. These factors include past violence, youth, lower socioeco-
nomic status, race, low IQ, criminal history, personality disor-
ders, alcoholism, drug abuse, mental disorders, marital status,
and unemployment. 91
Based on the identified factors, Kiassen and O'Connor ana-
lyzed data generated from 239 adult males at risk for violent
behavior. 92 The sample consisted of patients at a community
mental health center, whom researchers observed three and six
months after their release. 93 Klassen and O'Connor were able to
assess correctly patients' dangerousness 85.3% of the time.94
Fifty-nine percent of those predicted to be violent were violent,
while 94% of those predicted to be nonviolent were nonviolent.95
Based on these results, the authors concluded that violence pre-
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
86. See Angel et al., supra note 53, at 325.
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
89. E.g., Deidre Kiassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of
Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 143, 144-45 (1988) (discussing the success of clinical and statistical
studies in predicting dangerousness).
90. Id. at 144 (noting that "[c]linical predictions of dangerousness rarely
exceed the accuracy obtainable by chance").
91. Id. at 145-47.
92. Id. at 147-48.
93. Id. at 149-50.




diction is improving, but that false positive rates should gener-
ate "considerable caution"96 in predictions.97
In 1994, Robert Menzies authored a continuing study of 162
accused persons evaluated for dangerousness at the Metropoli-
tan Toronto Forensic Service (METFORS). 98 Using clinical and
actuarial techniques, experts and laypersons attempted to pre-
dict the dangerousness of the accused persons.99 Predictions
that the accused persons were dangerous were more wrong than
right. °00 Calling the empirical results "equivocal," the authors
urged caution in the use of dangerousness predictions in both
judicial and clinical contexts.' 0 '
The METFORS study is noteworthy because it addressed
the dangerousness issue in "probabilistic and contextual lan-
guage."10 2 The study provides the first systematic look at the
multivalent or fuzzy nature of dangerous predictions:
Whereas we maintained that any wholesale rejection of the concept [of
dangerousness predictions] was premature, it was still apparent that
any progress toward resolution of the dangerousness debate would re-
quire a fundamental refraining of theory, policy, and practice in both
judicial and clinical quarters. Of cardinal importance would be the rec-
ognition that danger [and] violence... are not discrete or insulated
entities amenable to narrow scientific calibration-rather, they are
complex, multidimensional, and discursively charged phenomena
103
In summary, studies on predicting dangerousness have
shown that experts are accurate in predictions of future danger-
ousness about one-third of the time 0 4 and that experts over-
predict dangerousness, yielding a false positive rate of sixty
96. Id. at 156; see also Deidre Kiassen & William A. O'Connor, Assessing
the Risk of Violence in Released Mental Patients: A Cross-Validation Study, 1
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT: J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 75, 80 (1989) (not-
ing that recent statistical predictions demonstrate violence is not as unpredict-
able as previously believed).
97. John Monahan & Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness and Commitment of
the Mentally Disordered in the United States, 15 ScHIzoPHRENIA BULL. 541, 550
(1989). After observing that courts are more comfortable than experts with
predictions of dangerousness, Monahan and Shah, like other experts, conclude
that "[tihere is guarded optimism in the field that it may be possible to improve
the validity of clinical predictions of violence." Id. at 550.
98. Robert J. Menzies, The Dimensions of Dangerousness Revisisted: As-
sessing Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1994).
99. Id. at 1-16.
100. Id. at 25.
101. Id. at 24-26.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id.
104. See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT
OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 77 (1981); Menzies, supra note 98, at 1.
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percent.'05 Thus, a number of nondangerous defendants are de-
tained without a prior adjudication of guilt. Furthermore, ex-
perts are better predictors of nondangerous defendants than
dangerous ones. 10 6 Finally, a fatalistic thread running through
the literature concludes that prediction despite its serious defi-
ciencies "has always been a part of life and has always been a
part of law."' 07 Prediction, alas, is an undeniable part of
detention.
B. LEGAL DEFICIENCIES IN PREDICTING DANGEROUSESS
Defendants have attacked pretrial detention schemes by
claiming that the test for detention is unconstitutionally
vague.' 08 They cite legions of scientific authority for the propo-
sition that it is virtually impossible to predict future dangerous-
ness within acceptable levels of confidence.' 0 9 According to this
argument, if the standard for pretrial detention fails to specify
relevant factors on which a court should rely in making predic-
tions of dangerousness, the standard is intrinsically arbitrary,
regardless of the protection the BRA affords." 0°
In United States v. Edwards,"' the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's overbreadth" 2 argu-
ment aimed at the District of Columbia pretrial detention stat-
ute. The court confined the doctrine to statutes that swept too
broadly and thus impinged on constitutionally protected con-
duct."-3 Because pretrial detention under the District of Colum-
bia statute (the forerunner to the BRA) applied only to regulated
105. TERENCE P. THORNBERRY & JOSEPH E. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY IN-
SANE: A CoMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 178-79 (1979);
Menzies et al., supra note 72, at 131.
106. Klassen & O'Connor, supra note 89, at 152-53.
107. MONAHAN, supra note 104, at 26. For an entertaining debate on dan-
gerousness predictions in the guise of a closing argument at a mock trial, see
Virginia J. McFarlane, Clinical Predictors on Trial: A Case for Their Defense,
in DANGEROUSNESS, supra note 54, at 209, 210-25.
108. See United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
rev'd, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985).
109. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-21 (Blackinun, J.,
dissenting).
110. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169-70 (1972).
111. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
112. The overbreadth doctrine requires the invalidation of a statute if it is
fairly capable of being applied to punish people for constitutionally protected
speech or conduct. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
113. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1341-42.
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conduct, the court held that the overbreadth doctrine had no ap-
plication to the detention statute."14
In United States v. Payden,"1 5 a federal district court in
New York addressed whether the BRA was "void for vagueness"
because it did not define dangerousness. The defendant con-
tended that the statute failed to give adequate notice of the con-
duct that would lead to pretrial detention.116 The court
disagreed, finding that the detention factors were sufficiently
specific to limit a court's discretion." 7 In justifying its conclu-
sion, the court observed that void for vagueness rests "on the
principle that a person should be free to plan his or her behavior
based upon laws which are clear enough to afford one a reason-
able opportunity to know what is permitted and what is pro-
scribed.""18 The court also noted that a statute is not tested in
the abstract; rather, it is examined in light of the facts of each
case.119
In reviewing the detention provisions, the Payden court
found that the statute provided ample notice of the proscribed
conduct.' 20 The statute states that a detention hearing will be
conducted upon motion of the government in a case that in-
volves, among others, "an offense for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Con-
trolled Substances Act." 12 ' The court observed that the prosecu-
tor had charged the defendant with three counts under the
Controlled Substances Act, all of which carry at least a ten year
maximum period of imprisonment.' 2 2 Thus, the court reasoned,
the statute clearly set forth those offenses that will give rise to a
detention hearing.123
The Payden court also rejected the defendant's vagueness
claim, noting that courts usually apply the "void for vagueness"
doctrine when a statute does not give notice of the prohibited
114. Id. at 1342.
115. -598 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1985).
116. Id. at 1395.
117. Id. at 1396.
118. Id. at 1395 (citing Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye &
Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984)).
• 119. Id. (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 495 n.7 (1982)).
120. Id. at 1395.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp II 1990).
122. Payden, 598 F. Supp. at 1395.
123. Id. at 1395-96.
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behavior. 124 The court concluded that "[tihe new bail statute
does not prohibit conduct, rather it establishes a framework for
a judge to detain an individual based on a prediction of possible
future conduct."125 Finally, in a terse statement to the defend-
ant's contention that the statute did not define the "danger" to
which it applied, the court stated: '"hile the statute does not
define the danger, it specifies a number of factors to be consid-
ered by the court in ordering detention."126
The limitation fashioned in Edwards and Payden on the
overbreadth doctrine is unconvincing, especially because the
BRA fails to define danger to the community. 127 Danger to the
community does not mean only physical danger. Congress also
meant to include non-physical danger, such as operating a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise.128 It is, then, fair to ask what the
limits are to this expansive concept of danger to the community.
May a defendant, for example, be detained for political reasons if
it can be shown that such activity might harm the commu-
nity?' 29 One court, grappling with the BRA's protean concept of
dangerousness, concluded that the BRA regulates danger to the
community posed by engaging in future criminal conduct viola-
tive of federal criminal statutes.130 The court based this conclu-
sion on congressional inability to enact laws to promote the
general welfare. 1 1
The term "dangerous" is imprecise because it could include
any unacceptable activity. The accurate prediction of danger-
124. Id. at 1396.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
128. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 12, 13, 19-20, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A-N. at 3195, 3196, 3202-03. Examples of the protean standard of dan-
gerousness include United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986)
(examining defendant's use of false identification); United States v. Coleman,
777 F.2d 888, 892-94 (3d Cir. 1985) (examining defendant's murder threats);
United States v. Daniels, 772 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1985) (examining defend-
ant's history of threats); United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 78-82 (2d Cir.
1985) (examining defendant's threats to arresting officer and two witnesses);
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1985) (examin-
ing defendant's history of violent crime); United States v. Simon, 760 F. Supp.
495, 497 (D.V.I. 1990) (examining defendant's attempt to tamper with jury);
United States v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85, 87 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (examining defend-
ant's receipt of child pornography in the mail).
129. See Andrew Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preven-
tive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BuFF. L. REV. 717, 745-48 (1972).
130. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
864 (1986).
131. Id. at 109.
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ousness, however, requires a narrow focus. 132 The BRA fails to
focus the task of predicting dangerousness.
The Supreme Court has rejected similar arguments regard-
ing dangerousness predictions in other contexts. In Korematsu
v. United States,133 the Court upheld an executive order to de-
tain Japanese Americans on the West Coast in detention camps.
Although the Court conceded that the executive order necessar-
ily caused many American citizens loyal to the United States to
be detained, 134 the Court nevertheless recognized the govern-
ment's "overwhelming" concern for national security. 35 The
Court struck the balance in favor of the government, noting
"[n]othing short of apprehension by the proper military authori-
ties of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety" could
justify race-based detention. 36
The Supreme Court has also upheld dangerousness deter-
minations as part of Texas's death penalty scheme in two cases
relevant to this Article. In Jurek v. Texas,13 7 the jury's consider-
ation of a defendant's dangerousness determined whether the
state imposed the death sentence. The defendant argued that
"it [was] impossible to predict future behavior and that the [dan-
gerousness] question [upon which imposition of the death pen-
alty rested] is so vague as to be meaningless."138 The Court
upheld the Texas death penalty statute against this constitu-
tional challenge, concluding that predictions of dangerousness
are "essential element[s] in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system."13 9
132. George E. Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes:
Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 Tux. L.
REV. 1343, 1344 n.1, 1345 (1977).
133. 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
134. Id. at 218-19.
135. Id. at 218.
136. Id. Korematsu dramatically underscores the dangers to individual
rights inherent in a strict application of a balancing test. For compelling dis-
cussions of how courts have used balancing tests to cut back the rights of indi-
viduals, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 776-77
(1964); Jeffrey Blum et al., Comment, Cases that Shock the Conscience: Reflec-
tions on Criticism of the Burger Court, 15 Hnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 713, 729-31
(1980).
137. 428 U.S. 262, 267-68 (1976).
138. Id. at 274.
139. Id. at 275. The Jurek Court further observed:
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be
made. Indeed, [because] prediction of future criminal conduct is an es-
sential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our
criminal justice system.., the task that a Texas jury must perform is
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Furthermore, the Jurek plurality held that the dangerous-
ness question was valid in determining whether to impose the
death sentence. 140 The plurality appeared convinced because
"all possible relevant information about the individual defend-
ant" was presented to the jury.141 The plurality thus found that
a trier of fact's dangerousness determination may have pro-
cedural validity despite its lack of moral or empirical
justification.142
Similarly, in Barefoot v. Estelle,143 the second Texas death
penalty case relevant to this Article, the Court held admissible
expert predictions of dangerousness in capital cases, even
though the experts made their predictions based on a hypotheti-
cal question, not on an examination of the defendant. One ex-
pert testified that he could "give a medical opinion within
reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the psychological or psy-
chiatric makeup of an individual"144 and that "there was a one
hundred percent and absolute chance that Barefoot would com-
mit future acts of violence." 145 Another expert echoed this pre-
diction when he answered the prosecutor's hypothetical
question.1 46 Neither expert actually examined the defendant.147
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Texas death penalty statute, apparently persuaded that the sen-
tencing authority reached its decision in good faith after hearing
all the relevant evidence. In fact, the record showed that expert
predictions of dangerousness were more often wrong than
thus basically no different from the task performed countless times
each day throughout the American system of criminal justice.
Id. at 274-75. In support of its conclusion, the Court cited to the use of danger-
ousness predictions in the context of bail, sentencing, and parole decisions. Id.
at 275.
140. Id. at 276.
141. Id. Texas juries were not instructed on what to do with mitigating evi-
dence adduced at the sentencing stage of a capital murder trial. See, e.g., Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (holding the Texas death penalty proce-
dure as practiced unconstitutional).
142. See Stone, supra note 54, at 21. Stone observed:
All the authoritative scientific statements on clinical and statistical
predictions of violence... say that it cannot be done with any apprecia-
ble precision. Yet the Supreme Court with sanguine assurance says
that it is done every day. It is rather like the man who is asked if he
believes in baptism. He answers, "Believe in it? Hell, I've seen it
done!"
Id. at 20-21.
143. 463 U.S. 880, 903-06 (1983).
144. Id. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
145. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
146. Id. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 884.
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right.148 The Court, however, characterized attacks on predic-
tion reliability as arguments to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility.14 9
The Supreme Court has also considered dangerousness de-
terminations in non-capital offense cases. For instance, in Add-
ington v. Texas,150 the Supreme Court addressed the standard of
proof required in adult civil commitment proceedings. The
Court held that adult civil commitment proceedings do not re-
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 1 1 the standard tradi-
tionally reserved for criminal prosecutions. 152 At the same time,
however, the Court rejected the preponderance of the evidence
standard embodied in the Texas statute out of concern that an
adult may be committed for nothing more than idiosyncratic be-
havior.' 53 The Court noted that because commitment necessar-
ily results in the loss of liberty, the risk of error should decidedly
favor the individual over society.' 54
Rejecting the most and least exacting standards of proof,
the Addington Court embraced the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard. 155 In embracing the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard, the Court made several troubling observations
regarding proof, certainty, and dangerousness: "Given the lack
of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis there is a
serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a
148. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that expert predictions as
to dangerousness are accurate about one-third of the time).
149. Id. at 898-99.
150. 441 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1979).
151. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
152. 441 U.S. at 431.
153. Id. at 427.
154. Id. Consequently, the mere preponderance standard was insufficient.
Id. In the traditional adult civil commitment proceeding, two issues are of ut-
most importance: the threat posed by the defendant to himself or or others and
mental disease. See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (dis-
cussing adult civil commitment).
155. 441 U.S. at 431-32. This standard is generally placed between the pre-
ponderance standard and the reasonable doubt standard. Id. In support of its
conclusion, the Court observed:
It may be true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as undesir-
able as an erroneous conviction.... [Ilt is not true that the release of a
genuinely mentally ill person is no worse for the individual than the
failure to convict the guilty. One who is suffering from a debilitating
mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor
free of stigma .... It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for
a mentally ill person to "go free" than for a mentally normal person to
be committed.
Id. at 428-29 (citations omitted).
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reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous." 156
Addington is inconsistent with prior and subsequent case
law. In Jurek v. Texas' 5 7 and Barefoot v. Estelle,158 the Court
had no difficulty permitting predictions of future dangerousness
(even those based on facts incorporated in a hypothetical ques-
tion) as long as the jury received all relevant evidence. Texas
prosecutors in a death penalty case must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt not only that the defendant committed capital mur-
der, but also, among other things, that "the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society."159 Requiring Texas to prove both guilt
and dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt in Jurek and
Barefoot is no more difficult than proving mental illness and
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt in Addington. "The
subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certain-
ties virtually beyond reach"160 in both types of dangerousness
predictions: 161
The Court must be wrong. The decision inAddington may well be sup-
ported by other considerations, but it is not justified by the impossibil-
ity of proving risk beyond a reasonable doubt. That an individual is
likely to be dangerous can be proved at any level required, provided
"likely to be dangerous" is given careful construction. If that phrase is
defined as "belonging to a group with a risk of dangerous behavior un-
acceptable in relation to its gravity, if the harm occurs, balanced
against the reduction of individual freedom involved in its avoidance,"
then the existence of a threat of future harm can be proved at the same
levels as many other facts. It is a fact in the same sense that a broken
bone is a fact. By contrast, if the phrase "likely to be dangerous" is
defined as requiring proof on a balance of probability that this patient
will injure himself or others, or that he is more likely to do so than not,
then it cannot be proved at any level of confidence, since it is very
rarely so. In the latter perspective, in practice, it can never be proved,
since at present our best predictive capacities fall far below the requi-
site level of proof.1 62
156. Id. at 429.
157. 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).
158. 463 U.S. 880, 896-905 (1983).
159. Tax. CODE CPiM. Paoc. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
160. Addington, 441 U.S. at 430.
161. For a discussion of diagnostic uncertainty in the context of civil com-
mitment, see Barry A. Martin, Criteria for Civil Commitment: Medicolegal Im-
passe, in DANGEROUSNESS, supra note 54, at 161, 167 ("Unfortunately, with
respect to both the diagnosis of mental order and the prediction of dangerous-
ness psychiatrists are hard pressed to meet even the civil standard of proof, let
alone the intermediate standard.").
162. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: An Argu-
ment for Limited Use, 3 VIOLENCE & VIcTIMs 263, 278 (1988).
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The Supreme Court addressed the dangerousness issue in a
slightly different context in Jones v. United States.163 The trial
court in Jones found the defendant not guilty by reason of in-
sanity of shoplifting. 64 After the government confined him for a
period longer than the maximum sentence if he had been con-
victed, Jones sought release. 65 He argued that once the com-
mitment period exceeded the maximum sentence of the crime
charged, the government either had to release him or commit
him under civil commitment procedures. 166 The finding that he
was insane at the time of the offense, Jones argued, was not
sufficiently probative of dangerousness to justify continued
confinement. 167
The Court rejected Jones's contentions, holding that the law
presumes mental disability and dangerousness to continue in-
definitely and that this presumption finds its genesis in the
criminal act to which Jones had pled not guilty by reason of in-
sanity.16s The Court embraced a broad definition of dangerous-
ness that included any person who committed a crime. 169 The
Court essentially concluded that Jones was a future danger to
society because he had stolen a jacket from a department
store.170 It was irrelevant to the Court that the crime was non-
violent; only Jones's plea, the court's finding of insanity, and the
concomitant presumption of continuing dangerousness were
relevant.
The presumption of continued dangerousness crafted in
Jones has captivated commentators.' 7 ' In criticizing the opin-
ion, Professor Elyce Zenoff challenged the Court's presumption
of dangerousness: "The majority seemed untroubled by the com-
plete lack of scientific support for its assumption that repetition
of either nonviolent or violent crimes can be predicted from the
163. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
164. Id. at 360. The prosecution did not challenge Jones's insanity plea, and




168. Id. at 364-66, 369-70.
169. Id. at 364-65 ("We do not agree... that the requisite dangerousness is
not established by proof that a person committed a non-violent crime against
property.").
170. See Zenoff, supra note 47, at 572.
171. See, e.g., Miller & Morris, supra note 162, at 279 (criticizing the pre-
sumption of continuing dangerousness); Zenoff, supra note 47, at 572-74 (dis-
cussing the tension between the presumption in Jones and prior case law).
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combination of mental illness and a single nonviolent crime."172
Other commentators echo those concerns:
The presumptions of continuing mental illness and dangerousness
were found by the majority, even though Jones had committed at-
tempted petty larceny of a jacket-an offense that, in "common sense"
terms, could hardly be termed violent. The willingness of the majority
to presume dangerousness on the basis of the plea of insanity, espe-
cially in the absence of any supporting evidence of the defendant's dan-
gerousness, is groundless-in short, Jones is a miscarriage of
justice.1 73
In Schall v. Martin,174 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a New York law that authorized the pretrial
detention of juveniles if a serious risk existed that the juvenile
would commit a crime before trial.'75 The statute did not define
the term "serious" or prescribe the standard of proof.'7 6 Fur-
thermore, it contained no guidelines or factors for predicting
dangerousness.' 7 7 Seizing these ambiguities, the defendants ar-
gued that it was virtually impossible to accurately predict future
criminality and that the decision to detain was intrinsically
arbitrary. 7 8
Relying on Jurek v. Texas,179 the Court dismissed the de-
fendants' arguments, stating "we have specifically rejected the
contention . . . 'that it is impossible to predict future behavior
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.'"180
Furthermore, the Court held that the New York statute served
the legitimate state interest "of protecting ... society from the
hazards of pre-trial crime"' 8 ' and did not violate a defendant's
due process rights.
The Court's analysis in Schall is deficient in several re-
spects. Most notably, the Court failed to appreciate how the
172. Zenoff, supra note 47, at 572.
173. Miller & Morris, supra note 162, at 279.
174. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
175. Under New York law, a court could order pretrial detention of a juve-
nile before a finding of probable cause if a court determined that "there is a
serious risk that he may before the return date commit an act which if commit-
ted by an adult would constitute a crime." N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 320.5(3)(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1983). For an in-depth discussion of Schall and the challenged New
York statute, see Ewing, supra note 49, at 175.
176. 467 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 278; see also Ewing, supra note 49, at 177 (noting that "[olnly the
foolhardy would deny" that errors will not be committed).
178. 467 U.S. at 278.
179. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
180. 467 U.S. at 278-79 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)).
181. 467 U.S. at 274. The Court found protecting the juvenile from the con-
sequences of committing a crime is a legitimate state objective as well. Id.
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dangerousness prediction is made under the New York statute.
Under that statute, a court makes the detention decision based
on the nature of the offense charged, a cursory review of back-
ground information and criminal history, and the testimony of a
juvenile probation officer.' 8 2 Little or no proof exists that these
factors are accurate and reliable predictors of juvenile
dangerousness. 183
More troubling was the Court's treatment of the actual evi-
dence introduced in Schall. The defendant introduced expert ev-
idence that prediction of future dangerousness under the New
York detention scheme was not appreciably better than
chance. 184 The district court endorsed the expert witness's view
that prognosis of dangerousness under the statute was "wholly
unpredictable." 185 The Court did not conclude that this finding
was clearly erroneous.18 6 Consequently, the Court upheld a de-
tention scheme that was no better than chance in predicting
dangerousness. 87
Finally, in United States v. Salerno,L88 the Court dismissed,
in a manner harkening back to Barefoot, the contention that the
procedures embodied in the BRA were inaccurate predictors.
The Court focused on dangerousness through a normative,
rather than empirical, lens and, relying on Schall, stated that
"there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of
future criminal conduct."189 The pitfall of relying on Schall is
obvious: Schall itself relies on authorities where the dangerous-
182. Id. at 283-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zenoff, supra note 47, at 594
n.188.
183. Zenoff, supra note 47, at 594.
184. 467 U.S. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. In fact, the Court casually dismissed the district court's findings of fact
on dangerousness predictions, an approach criticized by Justice Marshall in dis-
sent. Id. at 294 n.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. In Schall, the distinction between detention by decision and detention
by chance is one of process. Ostensibly, the former decision is made after care-
ful deliberation, and the latter simply by chance. From the perspective of a
detained juvenile, however, it does not matter that the court carefully deliber-
ates before rendering a decision whose probability of accuracy is slightly better
than casting dice or flipping a coin.
188. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
189. Id. at 751 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 278).
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ness prediction occurred after conviction,' 90 when a defendant's
right to liberty is at low tide.' 91
The Supreme Court has so far avoided assessing the accu-
racy of dangerousness determinations by conveniently recasting
arguments as raising legal and not empirical questions or, as in
Schall, by ignoring the evidence presented. Although determin-
ing what factors are appropriate in predicting dangerousness is,
in the first instance, a legislative question, whether chosen fac-
tors pass constitutional muster is traditionally a judicial ques-
tion. Perhaps the Court consistently diverts its attention from
appraising the empirical evidence regarding dangerousness be-
cause a forthright appraisal of dangerousness would often doom
the statutory scheme. 192 Meanwhile, by ignoring the empirical
question, the Court has yet to decide the level of confidence in
the dangerousness prediction process necessary to pass constitu-
tional muster. Thus, the Court has failed to scrutinize predic-
tive practice, a part of the warp and woof of American criminal
law. The defendant who challenges a dangerousness prediction
as unconstitutional meets the Court's refrain that "there is noth-
ing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct."19 3
III. PRETRIAL DETENTION AS A FUZZY SYSTEM
A. MATHEWS, METAPHORS, AND PERSPECTIVE
Framing the dangerousness issue is fundamental to the
type of procedural due process analysis that a court will ap-
ply.' 94 The paradigmatic model of detention frames the debate
in categorical terms. It asks whether a defendant is a member
of a class that Congress has identified as dangerous, not
whether a particular defendant is dangerous. By framing the
inquiry in such categorical, legislative terms, courts can skirt
190. Professor Ewing depicts Schall as a pragmatic policy judgment. Ew-
ing, supra note 49, at 207.
191. The Court relied on precedents involving dangerousness predictions in
the context of the death penalty, parole release and revocation, and sentencing
dangerous defendants. See Ewing, supra note 49, at 207.
192. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) (noting that an
acceptance of the view that dangerousness predictions are unreliable "would
immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of fu-
ture behavior are constantly made"); see also David J. Rabinowitz, Note, Pre-
ventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening The Innocent, 32
AM. U. L. Rav. 191, 201 (1982) (summarizing the research on the accuracy of
judicial predictions of dangerousness).
193. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
194. See Miller & Morris, supra note 162, at 278-79.
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the rigid due process requirements embodied in cases like
Goldberg v. Kelly' 95 and Londoner v. Denver196 and opt for the
less rigid requirements found in cases like Mathews v. El-
dridgex97 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization.19  Under the Mathews and Bi-Metallic line of
cases, when the class at issue is general or when expert testi-
mony helps determine an individual's membership in the class
vel non, the process due an aggrieved individual is substantially
lessened. 199 While Goldberg and Londoner would put the gov-
ernment to individual proof of a defendant's dangerousness and
need for detention, Mathews and Bi-Metallic question an indi-
vidual's interest in the deprivation process.
The contemporary procedural due process paradigm recog-
nizes a tension between what commentators have dubbed the
intrinsic value theory and the instrumentality or process-sensi-
tive theory. 200 The intrinsic value theory recognizes the dignity
of the individual, and demands that the individual receive ap-
propriate notice and a right to be heard before the government
deprives the individual of life, liberty, or property.201 The es-
sence of the intrinsic value theory is an individual's participa-
tion in the deprivation process and a decision maker's
explanation of that deprivation decision. 202 The intrinsic value
theory emphasizes fairness and individual dignity.20 3
195. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a pre-termination evidentiary hear-
ing is necessary to provide welfare recepients with procedural due process).
196. 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that due process can require that taxpay-
ers be afforded a hearing).
197. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of social security disability payments).
198. 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that where a rule applies to more than a
few people, due process does not require that each person have a direct voice in
its adoption).
199. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903-04 (1983).
200. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed.
1988).
201. See generally Frank Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: XVIII NoMos 126-27 (J. Roland Pen-
nock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (contending that due process vindicates
the values of participation and revelation).
202. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
at 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.").
203. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); TRBE, supra note 200,
at 666-67; see also Richard Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a
More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111,
117-25 (1978) (defining due process values in terms of the impact on the dignity
of those individuals affected by government action).
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In contrast, the instrumentality or process-sensitive theory
views procedural due process as a mechanism to ensure the ac-
curacy of applying general substantive rules to the individ-
ual.20 4 The process-sensitive theory does not recognize the
utility of participation of the individual per se; rather, it latches
onto participation of the individual as a means to ensure accu-
racy.205 The quest for accuracy in the decisional process thus
becomes the essence of procedural due process. 20 6 Accuracy be-
comes a thing in itself.
The Supreme Court appears to embrace the supremacy of
the process-sensitive theory of procedural due process, weighing
procedural safeguards primarily in terms of their contribution to
accuracy.20 7 This view elevates accuracy above the individual's
ability to participate in the deprivation process. Consequently,
under the process-sensitive theory, a court could deny pre-depri-
vation hearings as long as it conducts a post-deprivation
hearing.208
The present dichotomized procedural due process paradigm
is seriously misleading. In theory, and more importantly in ap-
plication, the two models of procedural due process are not divis-
ible. Accuracy in the deprivation decision, the touchstone of the
process-sensitive theory, is one of several values that the intrin-
sic value theory embodies.
Although heralded as the darling of the process-sensitive
theory, the Court's pronouncement in Mathews v. Eldridge20 9
rests on a firm intrinsic value theory foundation. In Mathews,
the Court upheld the Social Security Administration's proce-
dures for terminating social security benefits without an eviden-
tiary hearing.210 In its famous "balancing" test, the Mathews
Court required consideration of the following interests:
[First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
204. TRIBE, supra note 200, at 666-67.
205. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) ("[T~he essential
reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to prevent unfair and mistaken
deprivations of property.").
206. See TRIBE, supra note 200, at 667.
207. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976). See generally
Jenny Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Calculus for Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976) (criticizing the Supreme Court's emphasis on questions of
technique rather than questions of value).
208. TRIBE, supra note 200, at 673.
209. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
210. Id. at 349.
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the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.2
1 1
Thus, although accuracy may be the primary factor in the
Mathews calculus, the Court's balancing test reveals that the
term has no meaning standing alone.212 Accuracy cannot be a
thing in itself. The Court has stressed that "[t]he very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation,"213 because the
answer to what process is due turns on the individual's and the
government's interests. 214 A process-sensitive approach to pro-
cedural due process cannot define what accuracy is sufficient. A
court can fairly answer the question of accuracy only by resort to
the interests at stake.
The paradigmatic due process model conceals the need to
look outside the norm of accuracy for the substantive rights at
stake to give the goal of accuracy content and context. Once a
court isolates these external values, the principles and utility of
a process-sensitive model become secondary.215 Professor Lau-
rence Tribe argues that "[tihe process theme by itself determines
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its
211. Id. at 335. Appended to this calculus is the presumption that "substan-
tial weight must be given to the good faith judgment of the [agency] charged by
Congress with the administration of social welfare programs." Id. at 349.
212. The Court also noted the interdependence of substantive and proce-
dural factors, observing that "[s]ignificantly, the cost of protecting those whom
the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found un-
deserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since re-
sources available for any particular program of social welfare are not
unlimited." Id. at 348.
213. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
214. Confidence is directly related to the accuracy in the decisional process.
There are several ways by which accuracy may be measured. One method looks
at the number of successes and failures identified. See Underwood, supra note
53, at 1410 n.4. Another method measures the total percentage of correct pre-
dictions. Id. It is thus necessary when assessing accuracy to identify the
method by which the concept is to be measured.
215. Professor Tribe persuasively shows that
[elven the Constitution's most procedural prescriptions cannot be ade-
quately understood, much less applied, in the absence of a developed
theory of fundamental rights that are secured to persons against the
state-a theory whose derivation demands precisely the kinds of con-
troversial substantive choices that the process proponents are so anx-
ious to leave to the electorate and its representatives.
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067 (1980).
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content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and
values-the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at
such pains to avoid."216 He identifies numerous "superficially
procedural" provisions of the Constitution "such as the rights to
counsel, confrontation, bail, and jury trial" that draw their es-
sence from some substantive value or norm.217 According to
Tribe, these rights "function, often at some cost to the efficiency
and accuracy of fact-finding, to prevent the government from
treating individuals in the criminal process as though they were
objects."218 Individual rights may thus trump a model's goal of
accuracy.
Employing a value-based model of due process assessing the
individual's and the government's respective interests provides
insight into the accuracy determination. 21 9 The value-based
model recognizes that accuracy is an important goal, but one set
by reference to the conflicting substantive rights at stake, and
not one set in the abstract. It also recognizes that accuracy is
important, but not all important.
Applying the value-enhanced Mathews model to pretrial de-
tention, the individual rights affected by pretrial detention are a
defendant's freedom from incarceration before being found
guilty and from being labeled "dangerous" by the government.
The individual interests also include retention of employment
(which will surely be lost if detained on the basis of dangerous-
ness), the ability to prepare a defense (which may be inhibited
by pretrial incarceration), freedom from conditions of incarcera-
tion often more severe than those for convicted individuals, and
protection from higher conviction rates for those detained at the
time of trial.22° These interests are "collectively" fundamental.
216. Id. at 1064.
217. Id. at 1069-70 (emphasis added).
218. Id. (citations omitted).
219. The greater the individual right, the greater the need for confidence in
the decision. This basic tenet is the cornerstone of the three customary burdens
of proof generally recognized in American jurisprudence. The "reasonable
doubt" standard is reserved for crimes, the intermediate "clear and convincing
evidence" standard applies to quasi-criminal, stigmatizing allegations, and the
least-exacting "preponderance of the evidence" standard is reserved for most
civil disputes. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); see also RICH-
ARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND PROBABLILTY 114-40 (2d ed. 1983) (ana-
lyzing the various standards of proof). In the detention context, one must also
concede that the greater the confidence in the prediction of dangerousness, the
greater the government's concern for community safety.
220. Rabinowitz, supra note 192, at 211.
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The governmental interests implicated by pretrial detention
include protecting specific individuals or the community in gen-
eral from future crime while the defendant is free on bail await-
ing trial, protecting the public fisc against the cost of two full-
blown trials, and reducing the cost of housing defendants and
easing overcrowding by ensuring accuracy in the detention deci-
sion.221 The government's combined interests are compelling.
Presently, a court resolves a constitutional conflict pitting fun-
damental individual rights against compelling government in-
terest, in large part, according to the tool it uses to address the
conflict: categorization or balancing.
B. TH TOPOLOGY OF CATEGORIZATION AND BALANCING
1. The Tradition in Classifications
Professor Kathleen Sullivan has skillfully discussed the in-
herent differences between categorization and balancing, the
two techniques used in constitutional theory to constrain judi-
cial discretion.222 Both categorization and balancing tests are
tools of political and legal discretion. 223 According to Sullivan,
categorization requires a decision maker to classify and label
cases.224 Litigation then seeks to determine which category con-
trols. Categorization becomes outcome determinative. "Once
the relevant right and mode of infringement have been
described, the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial bal-
ancing of the claimed right against the government's justifica-
tion for the infringement."225 In contrast, balancing requires a
decision maker to weigh competing rights and interests. 226 Bal-
ancing is not outcome determinative, because the outcome "de-
pends on the relative strength of a multitude of factors."227
One familiar with Professor Sullivan's work may recognize
that the debate between categorization and balancing is remi-
221. Id. at 212.
222. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293 (1992).
223. Balancing tests are one of five rhetorical techniques used by courts.
See, e.g., Blum et al., supra note 136, at 715 (noting that court techniques in-
clude balancing tests, evasion of precedent, viewing facts as dichotomies, priva-
tization of governmental disputes, and idiosyncratic rule extension). All five
techniques allow a court to manipulate legal doctrine in accordance with its
own biases while paying lip-service to objectivity and fidelity to past precedents.
Id. at 727.
224. Sullivan, supra note 222, at 293.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 293-94.
227. Id. at 294.
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niscent of a similar debate between rules and standards. 228 In
fact, a rule is a form of categorization, and a standard a form of
balancing. The debate between rules and standards may thus
provide insight into the categorization and balancing debate in
the detention context.229
Although the dichotomy between rules and standards has
long been a part of the law,230 Professor Duncan Kennedy has
recently popularized the tension between the two norms used to
qualify formal realizability. 231 Kennedy has shown a modest in-
ter-connectedness of form and substance in private law adjudi-
cation. He argues that the two choices for the form of law, rules
and standards, each envision a different picture of the substan-
tive content of law.232 "In picking a form through which to
achieve some goal, we are almost always making a statement
that is independent or at least distinguishable from the state-
ment we make in choosing the goal itself."233 Kennedy further
identifies certain values modestly associated with the form of
law. With individualism goes rules, with altruism goes stan-
dards.23 4 He perceives the tension between individualism and
altruism as an "unresolvable conflict."235
228. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the 1991 Supreme
Court term).
229. The role and significance of rules and standards has aroused substan-
tial interest among legal scholars. See, e.g., ANDREw ALTAwN, CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 104-48 (1990) (arguing that claims of inconsistency between liberal
theory of law and liberal theory of politics are unpersuasive); MARK KELmAN, A
GUIDE To CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (characterizing the relation-
ship between norm and substance as aesthetic); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
By THE RULES: A PILOsoPICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAK-
ING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 (1991) (contending that "ruleness" encompasses
more than specificity); Louis Kaplow, Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analy-
sis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing rules and standards from a cost-benefit
perspective); Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781 (1989) (arguing that the rule-of-law ideal must be reinterpreted); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1988)
(discussing various perspectives on the dichotomy between rules and stan-
dards); Sullivan, supra note 228, at 26 (casting the the Supreme Court debate
between liberals and conservatives in terms of rules and standards).
230. See John P. Goebel, Rule and Standards: A Critique of Two Critical
Theorists, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 52-66 (1992).
231. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HAzy. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976).
232. "[T]he pro-rules and pro-standards positions are more than an invita-
tion to positivist investigation of reality. They are also an invitation to choose
between sets of values and visions of the universe." Id. at 1712.
233. Id. at 1710.
234. Kennedy, supra note 231, at 1710.
235. Id. at 1713.
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Much of the rules/standards debate ultimately turns on how
much discretion a superior authority wishes to leave to a deci-
sion maker.23 6 The superior authority can attempt to limit the
discretion of a decision maker by fixing rules or requiring cate-
gorization. Rules, like categorization, become outcome determi-
native. Both promote consistency, predictability, and judicial
restraint in decision making.237 By design, both confine a deci-
sion maker to the role of sifting through the facts, a task gener-
ally devoid of subjective value choices. 238  Rules and
categorization also provide fair notice of what is expected of the
citizen.239
Sullivan offers contemporary equal protection analysis as
an example of categorization. "[T]he two-tier system was meant
to enshrine penitence for the sins of the Lochner era by making
deferential rationality review the norm and strict scrutiny the
emergency exception where 'fundamental rights' or 'suspect
classes' were threatened."240 If the minimal rationality stan-
dard is applied, the government is supposed to win. If the strict
scrutiny standard is applied, the government almost always
loses. The sport is in the classification, not in the analysis.
In contrast, standards, like balancing, are indetermina-
tive.241 They are contextual determinations that, according to
Sullivan, embody the "pragmatic spirit of the common law
judge."242 Standards and balancing allow and encourage wide-
ranging discretion (legal, political, and otherwise) on the part of
a decision maker to decide concrete cases. Standards and bal-
ancing are arguably fairer than rules and categorization, be-
cause they promote substantive justice and equality. 243 Because
a balancing approach is not committed to a fixed protocol, the
decision maker is free to minimize the risk of error from the
236. A strong theme underlying the advance of rules over standards, and
vice-versa, is the mistrust inherent in the relationship between a superior au-
thority and the decision maker. "If the legislature trusted judges to execute its
intent, rules would only be a nuisance and a waste of time. No law would be
needed if judges could be completely trusted, just as infinite law would be
needed ifjudges were completely untrustworthy." David G. Carslon, Contradic-
tion and Critical Legal Studies, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1833, 1839 (1989).
237. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 400
(1985); Sullivan, supra note 228, at 62, 65.
238. Kennedy, supra note 231, at 1770 (noting that "rules are defined as
directives whose predicates are always facts and never values").
239. ALT iAN, supra note 229, at 107.
240. Sullivan, supra note 222, at 296.
241. Id. at 294.
242. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 27.
243. Id. at 66-67.
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over- and under-inclusiveness endemic in a rule or category.244
Endowing a decision maker with wide-ranging discretion, how-
ever, injects another type of error into the decisionmaking pro-
cess; namely, error from bias and incompetence.245 Moreover,
standards and balancing may provide less notice to citizens. 246
Formal logic incorrectly suggests a clear dichotomy between
categorization and balancing. Sullivan, in contrast, masterfully
portrays the blend of categorization and balancing in the context
of gender classification and affirmative action programs. She ob-
serves that the intermediate scrutiny that courts employ in
these areas is essentially balancing.247 Although a court em-
ploys the language of categorization in gender-based classifica-
tion and affirmative action reviews, it performs a balancing
function. Likewise, although a court may use the language of
balancing, oftentimes the actual analysis looks more like catego-
rization. This categorization disguised as balancing is the result
in the Supreme Court's detention cases.
Two Supreme Court detention cases, Schall v. Martin24s
and United States v. Salerno,249 illustrate the application of bal-
ancing tests that take on the air of categorization. In both cases,
the Court categorized pretrial detention as regulatory action,
not punishment, nudging the balancing metaphor into a pro-
government slide. In fact, these so-called balancing cases are
only disguised uses of categorization. Schall characterized the
government's interests in preventing juveniles from committing
future crimes while their cases await adjudication and in pro-
tecting juveniles from the consequences of their own unlawful
acts as at least legitimate if not important.250 The Court, which
took great pains to detail the government's interest, merely
stated the important interest of the juvenile from restraint
before an adjudication of culpability, and then discounted that
interest by observing that juveniles are not accustomed to unfet-
tered restraint because parental rights and schools traditionally
244. ALTMAN, supra note 229, at 107-08.
245. SCHAUER, supra note 229, at 149-55; Sullivan, supra note 228, at 58-59;
see also ALTMAN, supra note 229, at 107-08 (discussing the virtues and vices of
standards).
246. ALTMAN, supra note 229, at 108.
247. Sullivan, supra note 222, at 300-01.
248. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
249. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
250. Schall, 467 U.S. at 274.
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limit their liberty.251 The Court carefully insisted that it as-
sessed regulation of juveniles, not punishment.252
The Salerno Court masterfully used Schal 25 3 to uphold the
constitutionality of the BRA.25 4 The Court noted that "[c]rime
prevention is no less compelling when the suspects are
adults."255 Again, the Court exhaustively considered treatment
of the government's interests 256 while only begrudgingly recog-
nizing an adult individual's interest to be free from governmen-
tal restraint.257 Rhetorically, to mask the basis of the decision,
the losing interest ought to receive more time than the winning
one. In Salerno, this rhetoric is not the case. By truncating the
discussion of an individual's interest, the Court masked political
debate by depicting a self-evident resolution to the debate.258
By its sheer devotion to the governmental interest in sculpting
its opinion, the Court makes a convincing one-sided case for its
conclusion at the expense of a deeper discussion of the issues.259
Furthermore, the Court dismissed Salerno's claim that pre-
trial detention constituted punishment before a prior adjudica-
tion of guilt.260 The Court observed that punishment for a crime
requires conviction; thus, if the BRA's pre-trial detention provi-
sions constituted punishment, detention would be unconstitu-
tional. Nonetheless, the Court categorized pre-trial detention as
251. Id. at 265.
252. Id. at 271.
253. Professor Albert Alschuler, by studying earlier Supreme Court cases,
successfully predicted the Court's decision to uphold detention under the BRA.
Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 McH. L. REv. 510, 536 (1986). Al-
schuler's prediction rested on the Court's relatively recent captivation with bal-
ancing heuristics. He observed that the Court's approach is "tilted too far
toward interest balancing and too far from historic conceptions of individual
freedom." Id. at 511 n.1. For an interesting article exploring methods histori-
cally used by the courts in addressing competing interests, see generally T. Al-
exander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
254. Professor Mashaw has observed that the court's reliance on precedents
is the institutional defense against illegitimacy in a political democracy.
Mashaw, supra note 207, at 54.
255. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749-50.
256. The Court devoted 37 lines in the official opinion to developing the gov-
ernment's interests. Id. at 749-50.
257. Id. at 750. The Court devoed less than five lines to a discussion of the
individual's interest to be free from governmental restraint. Id.
258. See Blum et al., supra note 136, at 750. Furthermore, by treating a
point as self-evident, the Court can escape exposure of the political basis of its
opinion. Id.
259. Id. at 727.
260. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
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regulation-and not punishment, which requires that a defendant
receive due process.
2 61
Schall and Salerno employed a misleading balancing meta-
phor. The metaphor incorrectly suggests that a court has care-
fully considered and weighed all relevant interests in reaching
an objective decision, employing a test like the carpenter's
rule.2 62 Schall, Salerno, and to an extent Mathews, are trans-
parent; in each case the Court's approach to weighing the indi-
vidual's interest was incomplete.263 Its balancing test dwarfs
"soft" variables, discounting any possible synergy among the in-
terests weighed.264
Among the individual rights conspicuously absent from the
Court's balance in Salerno were freedom of association, freedom
from the loss of the defendant's employment and the capacity to
support a family, freedom from a tarnished reputation, freedom
from an increased probability of conviction, and freedom from
hampering an individual's defense.265 The Court also ignored
the "soft" variables of an individual's interest against the injus-
tice of punishment without an adjudication of guilt, which can-
not help but impair confidence in society, and society's interest
in preventing this alienation. 266
Moreover, it is fair to say that Salerno may have overstated
the government's interest in preventing bail crime. Studies
261. Id.; see also Donald W. Price, Note, Crime and "Regulation": United
State v. Salerno, 48 LA. L. REV. 743, 747-53 (1988) (examining the categoriza-
tion technique applied in Salerno). For other cases where the Court has em-
ployed a similar categorization technique, see generally Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (addressing loss of citizenship); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (addressing bills of attainder); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (addressing the deportation of aliens).
262. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 729.
263. For a variant of this observation, see Mashaw, supra note 207, at 38-
39.
264. Id. at 48. Professor Mashaw concludes that the utilitarian calculus
used in Mathews tends to ignore complexities and ambiguities. Id. The prob-
lem, as captured by Mashaw, is that the balancing test in Mathews asks unan-
swerable questions. Id. Other commentators note:
Completely missing from the balance [in Mathews] was society's inter-
est in having additional procedures, e.g., providing a source of informa-
tion to the general public on how their government is operating and
treating citizens; providing a check on powerful government bureau-
cracies; creating an incentive for governments to be careful, accurate,
and respectful of people they deal with.
Blum et al., supra note 136, at 729 n.143.
265. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Preventive Detention: A Species of Lyford Law,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 122 (1983).
266. Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1125, 1137 (1965).
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show that bail crime represents a small component of the total
crime rate.2 6 7 Consequently, the government may not be able to
prove in many instances the compelling nature of its interest if
actually put to the task.268 Furthermore, because of the superfi-
cial nature of its balancing inquiry, the Court failed to provide
due consideration to alternative measures the government may
take to further its interest while at the same time accommodat-
ing an individual's fundamental rights.269 A true balancing ap-
proach would account for these alternative measures.270
2. A Fuzzy Alternative in Classifications
A metaphysical assumption implicit in the traditional cate-
gorization/balancing debate is that a correct resolution to a
given dispute exists and a superior authority has already de-
cided it.271 Because the debate frames the relationship in terms
of accurate communication between superior authority and deci-
sion maker, implicit in the debate is a belief that the legal uni-
verse is completely filled.27 2 Courts, the decision makers,
cannot be trusted, and so the superior authority, the legislature,
searches for an equilibrium between, on the one hand, over- and
under-inclusiveness and, on the other, the risk that judges will
sneak in their own ethical preferences in lieu of the all-encom-
267. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that the 1992 re-arrest rate
for federal defendants was three percent); see also supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text (noting that bail crime represents about six percent of total crime).
268. Errors in detection and in failure to report bail crime would result in an
artificially low recidivism rate. George E. Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in
Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1981). This observation should be discounted, however,
until we learn more about the extent of measurement error.
269. For example, expedited trials, more courts and prosecutors, restrictive
release conditions, forfeiture of right to bail for bail crime, and stricter
sentences for pretrial offenses are just a smattering of less intrusive measures
to accomplish the governments goal of reducing bail crime. See Angel et al.,
supra note 53, at 359-68.
270. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with balancing tests, Blum
et al., supra note 136, at 746, it is far from the only model by which to analyze
competing interests. Professor Mashaw articulates several value-sensitive
models, relying on dignity, equality, and tradition. Mashaw, supra note 207, at
46-57. For a thorough discussion on other traditional models by which compet-
ing interests were gauged by the Court, see Aleinikoff, supra note 253, at 943.
271. Professor Frederick Schauer forcefully depicts a model of rules that
turns on a strong right/wrong distinction. ScHAunR, supra note 229, at 135,
149-55.
272. Arthur Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CAmDozo L. REv. 877, 880-
83 (1989); see also Carlson, supra note 236, at 1838-39 (describing Duncan Ken-
nedy's assumption that legislative intent is omnipresent).
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passing intent of the superior authority.273 Under this view, law
is a brooding omnipresence in the sky. There is always a right
answer.
Fuzzy logic rejects the notion of a filled legal universe. It
coheres with post-modern philosophy, according to which a
speaker never fills the universe with omnipresence. 274 Both
post-modern philosophy and fuzzy set theory deny the law of the
excluded middle as a confining force. 27 5 This denial implies that
any given set (or qualitative concept, for that matter) contains
things that are thought to be excluded. Every set covertly con-
tains its opposite; the set of A includes not-A. Every concept is
thus in a state of contradiction. Furthermore, what the qualita-
tive judgment "set of A" must admit, whether expressly or co-
vertly, is anti-quality. The opposite of the asserted quality of A
is negativity, or quantity. Thus, qualitative judgments fail; they
let in negativity, universality, quantity, and degree.
Fuzzy set theory, therefore, contradicts the traditional cate-
gorization/balancing dichotomy, which rests strongly on the law
of the excluded middle. Traditional analysis distinguishes the
use of categorization and balancing on the basis of a strong
right-wrong distinction. Categorization gets it "wrong" because
words betray the superior authority's intent leading to over- and
under-inclusiveness. Balancing, however, permits "wrong" re-
sults because a judge does not or will not commune with the
prelinguistic reality of the superior authority, which has already
decided who should win every contest.
The categorization/balancing debate further masks a deeper
schism in the law. Like language, the law is a system of thought
273. Schauer acknowledges a foundation of mistrust between the superior
authority and the decision maker. SCHAUER, supra note 229, at 158-62.
274. See Carlson, supra note 236, at 1838-39.
275. At the heart of the difference between formal and fuzzy logic is what is
known as the rule of the excluded middle. A basic principle of standard or biva-
lent sets is that an object cannot belong to both a set and its complement set or,
for that matter, to neither of the sets. The number seven belongs to the set of
prime integers, or it does not. The number seven cannot exist in both sets. The
rule of the excluded middle preserves the structure of Aristotelian logic; it
avoids the paradox that an object is and is not a member of the set at the same.
See Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, Sci. AM., July 1993, at 76, 76.
Fuzzy set theory rejects the rule of the excluded middle as a formal confining
force. Generally, objects only partially belong to a fuzzy set. A container can be
10% empty and 90% full, or 100% empty and 0% full, or 0% empty and 100%
full. Thus, the rule of the excluded middle, that an object is 100% in one set and
100% not in another set, is merely a special case in fuzzy logic.
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and of communication. 276 Categorization (like rules) communi-
cates outcomes to judges, litigants, and society in a clear man-
ner.27 7 Categorization, however, does not advance a debate over
issues, nor does the technique allow the law to grow through
new cases and observations. After all, what is categorization (or
a clear rule) but ultimately the death of thought? Balancing
(like standards) furthers the law's system of thought by expos-
ing to judges, litigants, and society the rationale of outcomes.
Although balancing furthers the debate over issues and allows
the law to grow with new cases, it often fails as a good communi-
cator of outcomes.
All of the law is classification. The struggle is to find accept-
able classification techniques.278 Categorization and balancing
are two classification techniques. Although their use may be in-
herently political,27 9 the commentators miss a deeper message.
That message concerns what system of the law, communication
or thought or both, is to be embraced.280 Justice Antonin Scalia
responds to this fundamental dilemma by embracing the law as
a system of communication.281 In Justice Scalia's world, the
judge is a communicator. Others respond by embracing the law
as a system of thought.282 In their world, the judge is a teacher.
In fuzzy systems, categorization and balancing co-exist as
classification techniques to address legal principles. 283 Use of
276. See generally NoAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND (1972) (exploring
the intersection of linguistics, philosophy, and psychology). I, of course, do not
mean that the law is only a system of thought and communication, but that
these systems are of more interest to me in this context.
277. In a nutshell, this is the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia. See generally
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 1175
(1989) (discussing the dichotomy between "general rule of law" and "personal
discretion to do justice"); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies,
and the Rule of Law, 62 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (analyzing
Scalia's methodology).
278. ALTMAN, supra note 229, at 104-07.
279. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 231, at 1751-66 (describing the influence
of politics on judges when deciding on standards based on the purposes of the
community); Sullivan, supra note 228, at 95-112 (discussing the extensive role
of politics in judicial conflicts over rules and standards).
280. To be sure, the degree of formal realizability of legal norms is modestly
connected to a substantive ethical view, and I believe this to be the message of
Duncan Kennedy and Andrew Altman. Lurking deeper, however, is the notion
that the degree of formal realizability is logically connected to the substantive
role of the law and the law decider.
281. Segall, supra note 277 (Manuscript at 9-14, on file with author).
282. I would place Duncan Kennedy, and, to a lesser extent, Kathleen Sulli-
van in this "category."
283. KosKo, supra note 13, at 167.
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each technique turns on how much the superior authority and
the decision maker know about the case before them. Categori-
zation allows small patches of judicial discretion, while balanc-
ing allows large patches of judicial discretion.
When a legislature or a court knows more about a problem,
categorization may be appropriate. Categorization, for example,
is appropriate for easy cases.284 In a continuous system, this
technique tends to establish more precision as a result of in-
creased knowledge about cases.28 5 By no means is this increase
in knowledge limited to precedent; custom, habit, and sense are
all tutors. Categorical systems, however, tend to lose their fuzz-
iness, and along the way, their common-sense meaning. As
courts acquire more knowledge, the number of categories may
grow exponentially and the systems may thus become unwieldy
and difficult to apply. Like any mathematical model, fuzzy logic
falls victim to the "curse of dimensionality."286 The system be-
comes increasingly precise, but less useful.287
Balancing is more appropriate when a court knows less
about a case. Balancing requires the court to analyze and weigh
the competing rights and interests. This balancing is typically
explicit in a court's written decision where "[c]andor and demys-
tification are independent goods."28 8 Spelling out the reasons
for a decision fosters debate, which in turn leads to both nega-
tive and positive feedback. A superior authority and a decision
maker may then use this new data to refine future classifica-
tions.28 9 The system of thought is not only continuous and or-
ganic, but also adaptive. Ultimately, the law's system of
thought will gradually give way to a system of communication
with the birth of rules borne of standards.
As Professor Sullivan has observed, classifications may be
driven by politics and by conceptions of the judicial role.290 Ac-
cording to the political perspective, contextual political consider-
ations are generally the only explanation for a particular
284. See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399
(1985) (examining how "easy cases" may provide guiding principles for under-
standing cases involving more theoretical issues).
285. KosKo, supra note 13, at 167.
286. Kosko & Isaka, supra note 275, at 81. This curse leads fuzzy systems
to become more complex and difficult to apply because of the massive increase
in small-patch rules. Id.
287. Id.
288. Sullivan, supra note 222, at 309.
289. Williams, supra note 19, at 315.
290. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 92.
368 [Vol. 79:325
classification technique.291 After discounting the political claim,
Sullivan suggests that perhaps the choice among classification
techniques may turn on a decision maker's conceptions of the
judicial role.292 The fuzzy model offers a third perspective that
is closely related to that offered by Sullivan. Perhaps the choice
between categorization or balancing turns on different concep-
tions of the system of law-communication or thought-held by
a superior authority or decision maker. Thus, Sullivan's per-
spective on the debate is the consequence of the classification of
the systems of law.
Legal classification relies on a scale of discretion conven-
tionally identified by reference to classification (rules) and bal-
ancing (standards). The degree of discretion employed turns on
how much we know and want to know about a case, the need for
debate, the need for fair notice, and general principles of effi-
ciency. These notions are in a state of contradiction. In deten-
tion cases, the Supreme Court has applied a superficial
balancing test that discounts an individual's rights and over-
state's the government's interest. The Court has essentially em-
braced categorization as its classification technique in the
detention area. The Court has done so at the very time it, Con-
gress, and society would most benefit from reasoned debate.
C. A RETREAT FROM A Fuzzy MODEL OF DETENTION: PosT-
SALERNO FORMALIST INTERPRETATIONS OF DETENTION
In United States v. Salerno,293 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of pretrial detention under the BRA. The
Court held that BRA detention neither deprived defendants of
their due process rights nor imposed excessive bail in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.294 Characterizing BRA detention as
regulatory, the Salerno Court concluded that Congress intended
to regulate bail crime and not to punish defendants.295
Authorities had arrested Anthony Salerno and Vincent
Cafaro on charges of mail and wire fraud, extortion, gambling,
and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Orga-
nizations Act.296 The government moved for pretrial detention,
291. SCHAUER, supra note 229, at 230.
292. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 95, 112. Sullivan shows that Justice Scalia
favors rules at the "interpretive and operative" levels, while Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter favor standards. Id. at 113.
293. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
294. Id. at 741, 755.
295. Id. at 748
296. Id. at 743.
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arguing that both defendants were dangerous and that no condi-
tion of release would ensure community safety.29 7 The govern-
ment presented evidence that portrayed Salerno as the "boss" of
the Genovese crime family of La Costra Nostra, and Cafaro as
one of his "captains."298 The federal district court ordered the
defendants detained without bail.299 The defendants appealed,
contending that pretrial detention under the BRA violated their
Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process and their
Eighth Amendment right to bail. 300
The Second Circuit agreed with the defendants' substantive
due process argument, holding that pretrial detention under the
BRA was unconstitutional.301 In reaching this conclusion, the
Second Circuit stressed the fundamental purpose of the criminal
justice system: to punish for past acts based on some form of
culpability of the defendant and thereby to minimize the risks of
future criminality.302 Punishment for anticipated future acts,
the court stated, absent the limited exception to protect the judi-
cial process, has no place in the American criminal justice sys-
tem.303 The court noted that liberty "is premised on the
accountability of free men and women for what they have done,
not for what they may do."3 0 4 The court thus denied that the
government has the constitutional power to curtail an individ-
ual's freedom simply to protect society, acknowledging that
every guarantee of liberty entails risk.305
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court ob-
served that "[iun our society liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited excep-
tion."3 0 6 The Court then held that detention based on future




299. Id. at 743-44. For a thorough discussion of the facts in Salerno, see
Marian E. Lupo, Comment, United States v. Salerno: A Loaded Weapon Ready
For The Hand, 54 BRoom L. REv. 171, 177-85 (1988).
300. 481 U.S. at 744.
301. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64,71 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S.
739 (1987). The Second Circuit did not reach the Eighth Amendment issue.
302. Id. at 73.
303. Id. at 71-73.
304. Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984,
1000-01 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 499 U.S. 978 (1986)).
305. Id. at 74.




The Supreme Court also concluded that the BRA did not vi-
olate the Eighth Amendment. Although the Eighth Amendment
clearly prohibits excessive bail, the Court noted that it "says
nothing about whether bail shall be available at all."3 0 8 The Ex-
cessive Bail Clause requires only that the court's conditions to
release or detain are not "'excessive' in light of the perceived
evil."309 The Court agreed that a primary purpose of bail is to
safeguard a court's role of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
defendants by, for example, preventing the defendant from flee-
ing or intimidating witnesses. The Court, however, also found
that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent the government
from addressing "the alarming problem of crimes committed by
persons on release."310
Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent observed that the ma-
jority rendered the Excessive Bail Clause a nullity by interpret-
ing it to apply only to cases in which bail is set, but not to cases
in which bail is entirely denied.311 The dissent cogently argued
that no real distinction existed between the effects of excessive
bail and denial of bail; in both cases the court detains the de-
fendant.312 If the Eighth Amendment protects against excessive
bail, it must also protect against detention that results from a
refusal to set bail. Furthermore, accepting the majority's bal-
ancing test for resolving Excessive Bail Clause issues, the dis-
sent asserted that the "compelling" governmental interest in
regulating bail crime under the BRA through the detention of
presumptively innocent adults was itself an unconstitutional in-
terest.3 13 Therefore, because the governmental interest de-
picted in the BRA was unconstitutional, any judicial balancing
test must favor of the individual.3 14
The Salerno Court also addressed the claim that pretrial de-
tention under the BRA is essentially a prior adjudication of guilt
of a presumptively innocent adult defendant, without the full
panoply of constitutional protections. The Court quickly dis-
missed the defendants' argument that detention violated sub-
308. Id. at 752.
309. Id. at 754.
310. Id. at 742 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 3, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185).
311. Id. at 760-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Mar-
shall's dissent. Justice Stevens filed his own dissent. Id. at 767 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
312. Id. at 760-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 762-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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stantive due process by concluding that detention was
regulatory rather than penal.3 15 The Court concluded that "the
mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the government has imposed punish-
ment."3 16 After reviewing the legislative history, the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended to regulate bail crime rather than
punish defendants for their past behavior.317 The Court con-
cluded that the BRA served the legitimate regulatory goal of re-
ducing danger to the community.3 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which a court could or-
der pretrial detention were sufficiently limited such that the
BRA was not excessive. To support its conclusion, the Court
stated that the BRA limits a court's discretion to impose pretrial
detention to "crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence
is life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, [and] cer-
tain repeat offenders."31 9 Based on the lack of congressional in-
tent to punish, coupled with the fact that detention clearly was
not excessive in all circumstances, the Salerno Court concluded
that pretrial detention was regulatory and not punitive.3 20
After deciding that pretrial detention was regulatory, the
Court balanced the government's interest in preventing bail
crime against the defendants' liberty interest.321 The Court con-
cluded that the government's interest in preventing bail crime
was compelling.322 Furthermore, the Court observed that it had
"repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in
315. Id. at 747.
316. Id. at 746-47 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
317. Id. at 747. Absent an express congressional intent to punish, the deter-
mination whether a restriction is punitive turns on "whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purposes as-
signed to it." Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
318. Id. at 747-48.
319. Id. at 751-52. The Court described other benefits available to a defend-
ant. It noted that the defendant was entitled to a prompt adversarial hearing;
that the length of detention was limited; that the decision to detain was made
by a neutral authority; that the court must consult eleven factors contained in
the BRA in considering detention; that the defendant has the right to counsel
and other important rights at the hearing; that the court must support its de-
tention decision by clear and convincing evidence and must reduce its order to
written form; that appellate review of a detention order is expedited; and that
the detainees were to be housed separately, if possible, from others serving or
waiting to serve sentences. Id.
320. Id. at 748-52.
321. Id. at 749-52.
322. Id. at 749 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
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community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh
an individual's liberty interest."323 Relying on the congressional
finding that certain defendants were likely to commit dangerous
acts after their arrest, the Court concluded that the BRA nar-
rowly focused on this particular problem presented by certain
classes of defendants. 32 4
Additionally, because the BRA requires the government to
show probable cause that the defendant committed the alleged
crime and to present clear and convincing evidence that no re-
lease conditions could adequately protect the community, courts
could not apply the BRA arbitrarily to all persons suspected of
having committed a serious crime. 32 5 Under these limited cir-
cumstances, a defendant's liberty interest does not outweigh the
government's heightened interest in preventing crime.3 26 The
Court noted:
We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this
right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where
the governments interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to
the greater needs of society .... Under these circumstances, we cannot
categorically state that pretrial detention "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."3
2 7
The dissent asserted that the majority misinterpreted the
punitive/regulatory distinction founded in substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence and, in the process, reduced the presumption
of innocence to a rule of evidence at trial, converting the return
of an indictment into a relevant piece of evidence at a detention
hearing.3 28 According to the dissent, to look solely to congres-
sional intent to determine whether a statute is punitive allows
Congress to recharacterize any punishment as regulatory and
thus evade strict due process scrutiny.32 9
Surprisingly absent from Salerno is a consideration of the
importance of the detention decision. The Court's complete focus
on the defendant's dangerousness has unfortunately led subse-
quent courts to concentrate on whether a defendant poses a dan-
ger instead of whether the court could reasonably mollify that
danger by release conditions.
323. Id. at 748. For an interesting discussion of the authorities relied on by
the Court, see Price, supra note 261, at 750-52.
324. 481 U.S. at 750-51.
325. Id. at 751.
326. Id. at 750-51.
327. Id. at 751 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
328. Id. at 763-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 759-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Salerno paved the way for the expanded use of pretrial de-
tention by focusing almost exclusively on the government's in-
terest in preventing bail crime. The Court ignored the BRA's
insistence on a careful consideration of release conditions short
of outright detention. 330 Salerno has, therefore, induced a biva-
lent drift in subsequent cases. Post-Salerno courts have concen-
trated on the danger a defendant poses to society, with outright
detention usually close on the heels of a dangerousness determi-
nation.33 ' These opinions generally lack any meaningful analy-
sis of whether release conditions short of detention would
reasonably ensure public safety.332 The courts' failure to do so
forces a decision maker to round off the evidence to either deten-
tion or no-detention. This binary approach is inconsistent with
the multivalent nature of detention under the BRA. Further-
more, the categorical model employed by the courts to assess de-
tention effectively kills thought on predictions of dangerousness
and on detention alternatives.
The anti-fuzzy nature of Salerno can be gauged empirically.
In an earlier article, I reported the results from empirical re-
search on the question of what detention factors courts empha-
sized in reaching their detention decisions.333 The statistical
techniques offer an enlightening glimpse at what drives the
courts' detention decisions. The statistical study identified four
decisional lines where detention was almost always ordered by
the court and one line of cases where it was almost always de-
nied.3 34 I detail the study because it shows that courts are em-
ploying a categorical model that is easily predicted.
One line of cases identified by the study turns on the rela-
tionship between the drug offender presumption and the defend-
ant's unemployment. Detention was ordered ninty-five percent
of the time when these two factors were present.33 5 Because the
presumption of dangerousness alone is insufficient to support
330. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (identifying statutory
conditions for release and alternatives to detention).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing the defendant's criminal activity).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Gerard, 664 F. Supp. 203, 206 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(stating that there is a rebuttable presumption against consideration of condi-
tional release); see also John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The Trial of Pretrial Danger-
ousness: Preventive Detention After'United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV.
639, 672-75 (1989) (analyzing Simpkins and Gerard in light of Salerno).
333. Williams, supra note 19, at 255.
334. Id. at 309-14.
335. Id. at 311-12.
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detention,33 6 it is reasonable to conclude that the relationship
between the presumption and a defendant's employment status
is significant to the detention order. One possible reason that
unemployment is a significant predictor of detention is that a
presumed dangerous defendant charged with a serious narcotics
offense with no obvious lawful means of livelihood is more likely
to commit future crimes. This presumption harkens back to the
vagrancy statutes that the Supreme Court concluded ran afoul
of the Due Process Clause.337
A second line of cases turns on the reputed organized crime
reputation of, and weight of evidence against, a defendant. If
these two detention factors were present, a court always ordered
pretrial detention.338 This decisional branch is also troubling in
that a court orders detention based on a defendant's character,
physical condition, or mental condition. Most of the defendants
who fit this combination are alleged members of organized
crime.339 It is this alleged status of a defendant, coupled with
the weight of the evidence, that results in detention. Danger-
ousness is apparently presumed from the defendant's character.
The problem with this approach is that both the character factor
under the BRA, and the types of "character," such as being a
member of organized crime, are vague.3 40
A third line of cases turns on the drug offender presumption
and a prior history of committing crime while on bail. Courts
ordered detention ninety-five percent of the time when these two
detention factors were present.3 41
A fourth line of cases involves a defendant's prior miscon-
duct. Courts always ordered detention when the defendant had
obstructed justice in the past by intimidating witnesses or
jurors.3 4 2
A fifth line of cases generally resulted in courts denying de-
tention. Courts deny detention eighty-six percent of the time if
the defendant has not engaged in the obstruction of justice, has
336. Id. at 293.
337. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972); see
also Douglas, supra note 10, at 11 (noting that little evidence supports the prop-
osition that a person with no visible means of livelihood is likely to commit a
crime).
338. Williams, supra note 19, at 312-14.
339. Id. at 312.
340. Id. at 309-14; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)
(holding that statute making it a crime to be a "gangster" violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause).




not triggered a presumption of dangerousness, and is of good
character. 343
Finally, the empirical study demonstrated that the BRA has
a disproportionate impact on Hispanic defendants. 344 Thirty-
five of the seventy-nine defendants in the sample were His-
panic.345 The findings confirmed a government study that found
the likelihood of Hispanics being detained without bail had in-
creased from 2.7% before the BRA to 33.2% after the BRA.3 46
This fact is striking when compared to the likelihood of deten-
tion for non-Hispanics, which increased from 1.6% before the
BRA to 14.1% after the BRA.347
These empirical results are troubling. They suggest the
possibility of abuse, derived from the incoherence in the present
detention model.348 The abuse may come as a result of the un-
focused task of predicting danger and detention; or it may result
from the courts' lack of perspective in assessing detention,
caused in large part by Salerno. Of particular importance to
this Article is that the statistical model can accurately predict
the outcome of about 80% of all detention hearings over 95% of
the time. The statistical results suggest that the courts are fo-
cused only on a defendant's dangerousness and are inattentive
to alternatives short of outright detention. Thus, although au-
thorities are still in the early stages of predicting dangerous-
ness, hard cases become easy as courts truncate debate by
formulation of if/then categories.3 49 In the end, society loses be-
cause creative attempts to condition pretrial release are not be-
ing considered.350
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE: A RETURN TO FUZZINESS
Commentators have demonstrated a moral and historical
justification for detention.351 The problem with detention under
the BRA, however, is not necessarily its moral or historical
343. Id. at 314.
344. Id. at 293.
345. Id. at 293 n.214.
346. BuREAu OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT, PRE-
TRU. RELEASE AND DErENTION: THE BAIL REFORM AcT OF 1984, at 4 (Frank D.
Balog ed., 1988).
347. Id.
348. See generally Williams, supra note 19, at 314-36 (analyzing the statis-
tics created by the research).
349. Id. at 310.
350. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
351. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Law of Dangerousness, supra note 22, at 26 (dis-
cussing Blackstone's affirmance of "preventive justice"); Miller & Morris, supra
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roots; the problem is the paradigmatic detention model itself
and judicial interpretation of that model. The paradigmatic
model is unfocused, untested, and unfair.
The paradigmatic model of how courts evaluate and deter-
mine detention is needlessly crude. It lacks sufficient sensitivity
to account for the gradations of an individual's and the govern-
ment's interests. Individual interests are not equal, and free-
dom from restraint is a right of varying degrees. Upon a greater
showing of guilt or a history of violent behavior, possibly while
on bail, the right weakens. Correspondingly, the moral and eth-
ical predicate for detention solidifies. Likewise, the govern-
ment's interest is not the same in every case. If the government
is concerned with protecting an individual or society from immi-
nent physical harm, that interest is greater than its interest in
protecting society from a defendant who may continue shoplift-
ing while awaiting trial. Society must remain vigilant that pre-
trial detention provides an extraordinary remedy to reduce the
threat of imminent physical harm.
The model of detention this Article proposes recognizes the
varying degrees of rights and interests held by individuals and
the government. It also embraces a model of due process set
forth in the Goldberg and Londoner line of cases.3 52 The pro-
posed model puts the government to individual proof of a pre-
sumptively innocent defendant's culpability, dangerousness,
and detention qualifications. It recognizes the defendant's au-
tonomy and entitlement to dignity from the government. By rec-
ognizing the right of a competent, sane adult to be free from
incarceration absent a prior adjudication of guilt, the model also
minimizes the probability of an erroneous decision infringing
this right.
Furthermore, the proposed model accommodates the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting society from the most egregious
cases of bail crime: violent offenses for which clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the underlying offense exists. The model thus
rests on a foundation embedded in blameworthiness, with suffi-
cient procedural safeguards to ensure that those detained are
not only dangerous to the community, but are also guilty of the
charged crime. Consequently, the proposed detention model is
founded on the moral and historical roots of pretrial detention.
note 162, at 265-67 (offering three principles for the just invocation of danger-
ousness predictions).





The BRA attempts to limit the application of its pretrial de-
tention provisions by delineating specific offenses that trigger a
detention hearing.35 3 Unfortunately, one of the specific offenses,
a "crime of violence," is too broad to meaningfully limit the appli-
cation of a detention model.3 54 A more balanced model should
identify with reasonable specificity the offenses that trigger de-
tention. This identification could be by type (for example, crimes
involving physical violence) or by offense (for example, kidnap-
ping). In either case, a more meaningful limitation to the appli-
cation of a detention statute is necessary.3 5
Furthermore, the BRA presently contains a requirement
that the government seek detention, if at all, upon a defendant's
first appearance.3 56 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the government's failure to meet the first appear-
ance requirement is subject to harmless-error analysis. 357 The
Court's holding effectively removes any teeth from the
requirement.
The first appearance requirement is an important safeguard
in the detention process. 358 Aside from minimizing the time
under which a defendant is held in violation of the Due Process
Clause, the first appearance requirement protects a defendant
from a vindictive government official or from threats of deten-
tion used as leverage in plea negotiations. Absent newly discov-
ered evidence, a defendant is as dangerous at the first
appearance as at some future date. A more balanced detention
model should therefore require the government, absent cause, to
seek detention at a defendant's first appearance in the charging
district.359
353. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
354. Alschuler, supra note 253, at 512 n.7, 567 n.252; Thomas E. Scott, Pre-
trial Detention Under The Bail Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27
AM. CamM. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) (1988 & Supp.
II 1990) (defining a "crime of violence").
355. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1985); see also Scott, supra note
354, at 33-34 (urging Congress to readdress the broad categories of detainable
offenses).
356. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
357. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716-22 (1990).
358. Id. at 722-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
359. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1005-09 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986) (noting that the detention hearing
should normally be deferred until defendant reaches the charging district).
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The proposed model should also limit the length of the de-
tention period. The BRA does not contain a specific length of
detention. 360 At some point, detention becomes punitive. 361
Fixing that exact point through the interstitial growth of case
law is absurd. In other words, balancing is an inappropriate
technique for setting a maximum detention length. Rather, a
detention model must contain a provision that clearly limits the
duration of detention. This time period can be fixed or it can
contain a provision allowing the court to extend detention for
cause shown. Silence, however, is not appropriate. 362
Detention under the BRA is an ineffective and unfair means
to minimize bail recidivism. The BRA is too one-sided. A more
balanced model should recognize that detention alone provides
minimal successes at great costs. Regardless of the model used,
nondangerous defendants will sometimes be detained while dan-
gerous ones are set free. Both errors are serious concerns. Con-
sequently, detention alone is a futile weapon in this struggle.
Detention must be part of a comprehensive bail package.
This package should include several factors: expedited trials,
additional courts and prosecutors, a hierarchy of restrictive re-
lease conditions, bail forfeiture if charged with a bail crime, and
stricter sentences for those who are convicted of crimes commit-
ted while on bail.363 Furthermore, detainees should be housed
separately from convicts, and in conditions at least as good as, if
not better than, those convicted of crimes. Moreover, detainees
should have free access to their lawyers. Anything short of a
comprehensive response provides a weak return on a substan-
tial social investment: the incarceration of defendants without
prior adjudication of guilt.
B. BURDENS OF PROOF
A fundamental issue is what burden of proof the Constitu-
tion requires for pretrial detention. The Supreme Court has
held that the "reasonable doubt standard" does not apply to the
360. Unlike the BRA, the District of Columbia detention model contains an
express time limit of 120 days for detention. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(h)
(1994).
361. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1005-09 (Timbers, J., concurring).
362. Because of excludable time, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), does not provide a satisfactory limit on the length of
detention. Scott, supra note 354, at 39-43.
363. See, e.g., Angel et al., supra note 53, at 359-68 (analyzing the alterna-
tives to preventive detention).
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detention of a defendant pending trial.364 The District of Co-
lumbia pretrial detention statute, for example, requires a show-
ing of substantial probability of guilt,3 65 as do the overwhelming
number of state statutes that provide for pretrial detention.3 66
United States v. Edwards,367 however, strongly suggested that
probable cause is a constitutionally permissible standard for
pretrial detention.
Probable cause generally means the existence of "facts and
circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an of-
fense." 368 Historically, courts used the probable cause stan-
dard when significant restraints on liberty were imposed.369
Relying on these cases, courts have concluded that the probable
cause standard in the BRA is constitutionally permissible.370
This reasoning rests on the Supreme Court's conclusion in Ger-
stein v. Pugh371 that a determination of probable cause must be
present for an extended restraint of liberty following arrest and
on the Court's embrace of Gerstein in upholding the New York
juvenile pretrial detention statute challenged in Schall v.
Martin.372
The BRA contemplates three decisions in the detention pro-
cess and embodies several standards of proof. The BRA first re-
quires a judicial officer to find that there is probable cause to
believe a defendant committed a crime triggering the applica-
tion of the pretrial detention provisions of the BRA. 373 This de-
cision is referred to as the culpability determination. A court
almost always extricates itself from the role of predicting guilt
by simply relying on the grand jury's indictment.374 The second
decision, known as the dangerousness determination, requires a
364. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
365. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1994).
366. See generally Goldkamp, supra note 355, at 33-38 (discussing various
state procedural safeguards).
367. 430 A.2d 1321, 1339 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
368. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
369. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119-21 (addressing detention after arrest
on criminal violations); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (ad-
dressing probation violations); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972)
(addressing parole violations).
370. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
371. 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975).
372. 467 U.S. 253, 277 (1983).
373. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. HI 1990).
374. Although the language is unequivocal and unambiguous, all the appel-
late courts addressing the issue have concluded that the return of an indict-
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judicial officer to find, presumably by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that a defendant poses a danger to the community or to a
particular person.3 75 The third function is the detention deter-
mination. It requires a judicial officer to find by clear and con-
vincing evidence that no release conditions can reasonably
assure community safety.3 76 A more balanced detention model
should specifically identify the three predictive tasks a court
must accomplish in the detention process, and should expressly
state the relevant standards of proof.
1. Culpability Determination
In the culpability determination, the BRA does not require a
finding of convictability as a prerequisite to detention. "Indeed,
in most federal cases, only an ex parte, in camera determination
of probable cause by a grand jury... guards against preventive
incarceration of the innocent." 77 In federal criminal proceed-
ings, the determination of probable cause usually is made by a
grand jury. The grand jury proceedings are in camera, the rules
of evidence do not apply, and a defendant has no right to appear
or submit evidence.378 Furthermore, the government does not
even have the duty to disclose to the grand jury evidence of an
exculpatory nature.37 9
The culpability determination requires a judicial officer to
find probable cause that a defendant committed the offense
charged. The judicial officer is to make this determination after
a detention hearing.380 Despite unambiguous language in
§ 3142(e) requiring a judge to hold a hearing to determine a de-
fendant's culpability, every appellate court addressing the issue
has concluded that an indictment establishes the probable cause
ment by the grand jury satisfies this requirement. See infra note 381 and
accompanying text (discussing the grand jury).
375. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Contrary to some descrip-
tions of the BRA, see United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir.
1985), the statute does not require clear and convincing evidence of dangerous-
ness. Alschuler, supra note 253, at 513.
376. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (1988 & Supp. 1 1990).
377. Alschuler, supra note 253, at 518.
378. FED. R. Crum. P. 5-7; see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
361-64 (1956) (holding that indictments do not violate the Fifth Amendment).
379. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1745 (1992).
380. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. H 1990) ("If, after a hearing... the
judicial officer finds no condition or combination of conditions will reasonable
assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other




finding that section contemplates.38 1 Without disclosing its new
role, the grand jury thus plays an integral role in the detention
process.
Section 3142(e) unequivocally requires a judicial officer to
find, aftera hearing, probable cause to believe that the defend-
ant committed the crime charged. At least three reasons sup-
port this assertion. First, the statute itself requires the judicial
officer to make the finding. Congress did not state that the
courts could abdicate this responsibility. It is a safe assumption
that Congress knew the grand jury's role in the federal criminal
process. By specifically providing that a judicial officer make the
culpability finding after a hearing, Congress necessarily ex-
cluded the grand jury from the detention process.38 2
Fuzzy logic provides a second argument. Probable cause is
a fuzzy concept. What an audience held captive by the prosecu-
tion may conclude constitutes probable cause may be something
quite different than what a court concludes is probable cause at
a detention hearing. Although the Constitution tolerates the
fuzziness of the probable cause standard, this may not be the
case when a defendant who has not been found guilty suffers
prolonged incarceration. Furthermore, a grand jury's probable
cause determination is made absent rigorous counterfactual evi-
dence, cross-examination, or challenges to credibility. 38 3 Again,
the Constitution may tolerate flexibility in the probable cause
determination that leads to an indictment, but not in the case of
pretrial detention.3 84
381. See United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115,
118-19 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1478-79 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985).
382. If the statute were silent as to who makes the probable cause finding,
then the arguments accepted by the eight circuits would have force. See supra
note 381 (listing the eight decisions holding that an indictment establishes suf-
ficient probable cause for detention). As presently drafted, however, to conclude
that the grand jury indictment constitutes the probable cause finding required
under § 3142(e) is to assert that Congress did not say what it meant.
383. See, e.g., Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744-54 (holding that a prosecutor has
no duty to disclose known exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
384. A more troubling question is whether the prosecutor must disclose to
the grand jury the government's intent to rely on the indictment to seek deten-
tion of the defendant. Arguably, the grand jury should be made aware of the
new role it plays in the detention process. Nonetheless, in light of the limited
powers a federal court has over the grand jury, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
382 [Vol. 79:325
1994] FUZZY LOGIC
A third argument requiring a judicial hearing recognizes
that the probable cause determination serves a secondary role in
the detention process. It triggers the presumptions of danger-
ousness under § 3142(e). The BRA describes two sets of circum-
stances under which a rebuttable presumption arises that no
form of conditional release is adequate to protect the commu-
nity.385 The first rebuttable presumption arises when the de-
fendant has a history of pretrial criminality (the "previous-
violator" presumption).38 6 Congress believed the first rebuttable
presumption strongly suggested that a defendant would resort
to violence while out on bail, because the defendant had actually
done so in the past. As such, this predictor covers precisely the
type of conduct the BRA is designed to prevent. The second re-
buttable presumption arises when a defendant is charged with a
drug offense punishable by at least ten years38 7 or with the use
of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking crime.38 8 It arises from the charged crime, rather
than a record of recidivism, and may be referred to as the "drug-
and-firearm-offender" presumption.
Both presumptions are important factors in the detention
decision because they do not "burst" when rebutted. Generally,
the presumptions, once triggered, shift only the burden of pro-
States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-57 (1988), the present Supreme Court would probably
reject an attempt by the courts to force the prosecutor to make the disclosure.
385. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
386. Section 3142(e) provides that if a defendant is charged with one of the
serious offenses described in subsection (f)(1), a rebuttable presumption arises
if the judicial officer finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another (f)(1) offense (or a
state equivalent);
(2) the offense was committed while the defendant was on pretrial re-
lease; and,
(3) the period between the offense presently charged and the date of
the conviction or release from prison (whichever is later) is no more
than five years.
18 U.S.C. 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
387. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952(a), 953(a), 955, 959 (1988). For drug charges to
trigger the drug-and-firearm-offender presumption, the defendant must be
charged with at least one offense that carries a 10-year maximum sentence.
GOLASH, supra note 44, at 15. The government cannot aggregate all the
charges to meet this requirement. United States v. Hinote, 789 F.2d 1490, 1491
(11th Cir. 1986); see also WEUMBERG, supra note 42, at 7-25 (discussing complex
pretrial detention cases). Moreover, it is the statutory maximum penalty and
not the recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines that triggers
the presumption. Hinote, 789 F.2d at 1491.
388. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988).
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duction, not the burden of persuasion. 389 Several courts have
held that the presumption alone can result in the defendant's
detention.3 90 Consequently, the judicial officer's role in deter-
mining probable cause is an important procedural safeguard
that minimizes the risk of an unnecessary confinement. 391
The Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh,3 92 demands
only a fair probability of guilt or a substantial basis for believing
a defendant guilty.393 Although Gerstein applied only to tempo-
rary restraints of liberty incident to arrest, Congress incorpo-
rated the decision's probable cause standard into the BRA.
Gerstein determined what kind of probable cause is required
when the government seeks limited detention.3 94 The Court
outlined procedures that it deemed necessary for "limited post-
arrest detention."3 95 One commentator thus observed, "Ger-
stein's probable cause finding may be a necessary prerequisite to
detaining an individual on the basis of dangerousness, but it is
not, in and of itself, constitutionally sufficient."3 96 A Gerstein
probable cause hearing and the BRA detention hearing are
analogous (each hearing determines when a court may detain an
389. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the presumptions of detention doe not shift the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant); United States v. Martin, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that the government retains the burden of persuasion). Even
where there is probable cause to believe that a defendant appearing at a deten-
tion hearing on other charges may also have committed a firearm violation, the
drug-and-firearm-offender presumption cannot arise if the defendant has not
yet been charged with the firearm offense by a "valid complaint or indictment."
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985).
390. E.g., United States v. Aiello, 598 F. Supp. 740, 744 (S.D.N.Y 1984)
(holding that the government meets its burden if the defendant fails to rebut an
established presumption). But see United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489,
497 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding "several problems" with Aiello).
391. United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (D. Kan. 1986).
392. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
393. Id. at 120.
394. Id. at 105; see also Alschuler, supra note 253, at 559 (discussing the
Court's reasoning in Gerstein). In Gerstein, the Court did not hold that the de-
fendants could be imprisoned to protect the community from crime simply be-
cause judges had found probable cause for their arrest. The Supreme Court had
indicated almost a quarter of a century before Gerstein that the sole purpose of
pretrial detention is to ensure a defendant's appearance. See Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). Federal statutory law expressed the same principle. See
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214-217, repealed by Bail
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-211 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
395. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
396. Cohen, supra note 46, at 329.
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individual before trial), but they are incongruent. The former
restraint on liberty is traditionally of short duration, while the
latter may result in an extended restraint of liberty, branding
the individual as dangerous even if later found not guilty.
Professor Alschuler convincingly maintains that the BRA
fails to require adequate preliminary proof of guilt or con-
victability as a predicate for extended detention.3 97 He argues
that a finding of substantial probability that the defendant com-
mitted the charged offense should precede imposition of pretrial
detention. 398 Consequently, because the BRA fails to require
substantial preliminary proof of a defendant's guilt, Professor
Alschuler contends that it is unconstitutional.3 99
He also draws a striking analogy between pretrial detention
and preliminary injunctive relief employed in the civil context.
Like the civil preliminary injunction, pretrial detention affords
the government interim relief in a criminal case. 400 In seeking a
preliminary injunction, the proponent must show, among other
things, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 40 1 No
similar requirement under the BRA protects the defendant. An
anomaly thus results: a criminal defendant, whose liberty
hangs in the balance, receives less protection than parties to
civil litigation, who may be disputing something so relatively
minor as the ownership of property.40 2
397. Alschuler, supra note 253, at 511.
398. Id. at 560. Professor Alschuler contends that detention should be per-
mitted only on the basis of a substantial showing that it will appear justified
following a final adjudication; that is, that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged. Aluscher thus believes that
the constitutional standard for detention without bond should be no
different from the standard for denying bail that has been part of our
nation's jurisprudence from the beginning. This detention should be
permissible only when "the proof is evident or the presumption great."
In more familiar, modernized language, this standard requires "clear
and convincing evidence" of guilt or convictability as a prerequisite to
detention.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 557 ("A society committed to the proposition that only deliberate
wrongdoing justifies imprisonment may permit even defendants charged with
capital crimes to remain at large when the proof is not evident or the presump-
tion great.").
400. Id. at 566.
401. See John Leubsdorf, The Standard of Preliminary Injunctions, 91
HARv. L. Ray. 525, 526 (1978).
402. Justice Stewart observed in his Gerstein concurrence that "the Consti-
tution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is
required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account." Ger-




Although the BRA declares that a court shall take the
weight of the evidence into account, 40 3 the BRA does not indi-
cate what weight the court shall give it. A court might afford
substantial weight to this consideration, refusing to order deten-
tion unless the preliminary evidence clearly and convincingly in-
dicates guilt. Nonetheless, Professor Alschuler asserts that
"Congress' rejection of a requirement of preliminary proof of
guilt reveals that it did not intend this construction; and treat-
ing one factor to be considered differently from all others would
require a strained reading of the statute."40 4
Professor Alschuler's contention is not persuasive. The de-
tention factors are dynamic; there is no indication that a court
must give the factors equal weight. To the contrary, Congress
has identified one detention factor, community ties, as bearing
little relevance to the dangerousness determination. 405 Fur-
thermore, some factors may emerge through experience as reli-
able predictors of detention, while others will demonstrate little
correlation.40 6
As to the culpability determination, the standard of proof
should thus be increased so that the government must prove
guilt of the offense charged by clear and convincing evidence.
This more exacting standard removes the grand jury from the
detention process, provides the moral predicate for curtailing
one's liberty, aligns detention under the federal law with that of
almost all state detention models, 40 7 and minimizes the effect
(but not the likelihood) of a Type I error (detaining a
nondangerous defendant).408
2. Dangerousness Determination
A court's second prediction is the dangerousness determina-
tion. A host of problems accompany this component of the BRA.
Many authorities overlook the third prediction and thereby
overemphasize the dangerousness determination. 40 9 Moreover,
many authorities mistakenly believe that the government must
403. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
404. Alschuler, supra note 253, at 567 n.252.
405. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 31, at 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3207.
406. See Williams, supra note 19, at 306-16.
407. See Goldkamp, supra note 355, at 7 n.26.
408. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining Type I errors).
409. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir.) (discussing




show by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is dan-
gerous.410 Additionally, because of the conflicting standards of
proof and collapsed predictive tasks of the dangerousness deter-
mination, troubling permutations may arise. For example, a
presumptively innocent defendant indicted by the grand jury,
found more likely than not to be dangerous, may be detained.
This result affords less protection to an innocent adult than con-
stitutionally required for mentally ill adults subject to involun-
tary commitment.411 Furthermore, a court may misplace its
focus on the dangerousness issue and not on the ultimate issue
of detention under the BRA: whether any release conditions
would reasonably ensure community safety. Post-Salerno courts
utterly fail to recognize that a finding of danger by any quantum
of proof is insufficient to support detention under the BRA.412
The American Bar Association has rejected pretrial deten-
tion of "the dangerous defendant" on the ground that "[t]oo little
is now known of the true need for preventive detention and of
the predictive techniques required to operate the system with
tolerable accuracy."413 The ABA has, however, embraced dan-
gerousness predictions to enhance sentences.4 14 The apparent
inconsistency in the ABA's approach exists because one use in-
volves a prediction after an individual has been found guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt; the other prediction involves a
presumptively innocent person accused of committing a crime.
In both cases, society curtails liberty. When a person is found
guilty, society confines with a clear conscience. But before an
adjudication of guilt, when society confines, it does so with less
than good conscience. 415
The fundamental flaw of the dangerousness determination
under the BRA is that it is unguided and unfocused. Danger
should be specifically defined. The BRA fails to define it. Dan-
ger should be defined as the potential for inflicting serous bodily
410. See, e.g., United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400,405 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating a standard for clear and convincing evidence).
411. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.09 (1992) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence for involuntary commitment to mental hospitals).
412. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (describing post-Salerno
overemphasis on dangerousness).
413. AmlERCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RE-
LEASE § 5.5, at 69 (1968).
414. Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal
Justice, 85 MICH. L. Rnv. 481, 496 (1986).
415. Id. at 508.
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harm.416 It should focus on risks to person and not to property.
An argument that all crime is serious, though accurate, is mean-
ingless. Even if all crime is serious, some crimes are more seri-
ous than others. The government must not cast too wide a net.
Thus, a protean concept of danger must be rejected. Moreover,
the government should need to prove dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence. The Court's justification for this stan-
dard in Addington applies equally well in this context.417
Furthermore, more research is necessary to identify and
verify predictors of dangerousness. The BRA factors are suspect
at best, and wholly insufficient at worst. Professor Dietz has at-
tempted to identify a number of factors. 418 His list, and the lists
of others, should be empirically tested to provide more guidance
to courts and to channel their discretion. Moreover, inter-judge
and intra-judge comparisons of predictions should be made and
studied.419 Finally, any presumptions of dangerousness should
be discarded, especially those lacking empirical support.
3. Detention Determination
The BRA provides that a court shall detain a defendant if it
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that no release con-
ditions would reasonably assure community safety. The pri-
mary focus is not on safety or dangerousness, but on whether
there are sufficient release conditions to assure community
safety. The BRA lists a number of alternate release condi-
tions.420 Case law has added drug testing, house arrest, daily
telephone reporting, and surrender of firearms to the list.421
The proposed model highlights the detention prediction as
an important, but often overlooked, determination. It retains
most of the BRA provisions but clearly requires that the focus of
a court must ultimately rest on reasonable release conditions.
Danger alone should not end the inquiry. Danger alone should
not be congruous with detention.
416. But cf Ewing, supra note 49, at 200-06 (doubting the existence of any
effective measure for potential dangerous behavior).
417. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text (discussing the stan-
dard of proof adopted in Addington).
418. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing Dietz's
study).
419. See Williams, supra note 19, at 315-16.
420. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988 & Supp. H 1990); see also supra note 43
and accompanying text (detailing statutory alternatives).




Court predictions of dangerousness are problematic. Nev-
ertheless, as Professor Alschuler observed, predicting the
weather is a difficult task, but "almost anyone can do it when a
funnel cloud is headed in his direction."422 Similarly, the role of
dangerousness predictions in the criminal justice process is so
systemic that it will remain a part of the warp and woof of the
judicial role. What is most troubling about the dangerousness
issue, however, is the lack of judicial candor in both reviewing
the legislative factors that support detention and in recognizing
the ability to predict dangerousness in the first instance. Issues
awaiting a frank judicial assessment include reliability and ac-
curacy of the legislative factors in predicting dangerousness and
the possibility that a defendant's character or employment is no
better a predictor of dangerousness than flipping a coin. Any
progress in resolving these difficult issues will require approach-
ing these problems in a manner that fundamentally modifies
theory, policy, and practice.
A defendant with a history of violent behavior is a likely
candidate to engage in continuing criminality. Nonetheless,
under the BRA, a federal court may not detain a person based on
future dangerousness without a showing of some likelihood of
guilt. The question then becomes how much confidence one
must have in the culpability determination to support a deten-
tion policy. It is a dismal but inevitable fact that the criminal
justice system will detain innocent and nondangerous individu-
als. Courts utilize three criteria that comprise the detention
process (the culpability, danger, and detention decisions) in a
sea of uncertainty. The BRA provides that only probable cause
is necessary to detain a presumptively innocent defendant
before trial; the courts appear to agree. Professor Alschuler con-
vincingly counters that when a responsible adult has done noth-
ing wrong, the adult's apparent dangerousness is not an
appropriate basis for detention. The proposed model requires at
least a showing of clear and convincing evidence of guilt before
detention. 423 This view is consistent with detention history and
almost all state pretrial detention schemes. 424
The idea of law as inherently dichotomous is a deeply en-
trenched one. Formal logic has dominated our conception of
what an ideal legal system should be. The law's artificial matrix
422. See Alschuler, supra note 253, at 544.
423. Id. at 511.
424. See Goldkamp, supra note 355, at 72.
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of black and white, while offering the power of precision, leads to
a loss of important information. The paradigmatic detention
model as recast by the Supreme Court in Salerno is unfaithful to
the purpose and focus of the BRA. Its focus on danger and not
detention skews decisions in favor of outright detention as op-
posed to release on conditions. The fuzzy model proposed in this
Article recognizes a reality of partial truths. It accounts for the
varying shades of gray encountered throughout the criminal jus-
tice system. It recognizes that the culpability, danger, and de-
tention determinations are all fuzzy, all matters of degree.
